Col. Arthur Kell¥
Fr-ankfort, KY

•

.

Q.

John Hanrahan

A.

Arthur Kelly

/1

Nt

'21

(O-D )

February 5, 1984

o.

WheJ did you go to Vietnam?

A.

I went in August of 1966.

Q.

That was early in the time of Lyndon Johnson's decision to increase
American involvement in Vietnam. Old you go with an outfit?

A.

No. I had, just completed the Marine Corps Command St8ff College and
I got orders to the 1st Cav division which, at that time was located
at Ankle. I took a thirty day leave and spent it in Springfield. KY.

I left my family there and I was to go over and take over an arti'lery
batallion.

From Springfield I went to California.

At that time most

of the replacements were going to Vietnam via commercial air. The
~st ~av
was operating in the II Corps zone with headauarters at
Pleiku and 1st Cav Division was located in Ankle and they were using
the Air Force transport planes. We left from an air base in California
and landed in Pleiku . When I was in California there was an incident
that frightened us a little bit. We were loading up and got on the
aircraft and got on the end of the runway and the pilot gave it full
throttle and pulled us back in our seats. About the time we should
have been taking off he pulled the throttle back and gave it full
brakes. We didn't know what was going on. He managed to get it stopped
What had happened was a light had indicated that a lock on the back
door was not closed properly. They had had an incident where they
were flying troops to Vietnam on this type of aircraft and the back
door had come open and when the plane de-pressurized, it had killed a
couple of troops. They went back and worked on it awhile and we
started off and it did the same thing again. The third time we did
get off. As we were crossing the ocean someone came back and told us
an aircraft was down. We all thought it was loaded with troops and
we were concerned about the news getting back to the families, because
they kn~w we were en route to Vietnam. As a matter of fact I had ca ll ed
Ollie just before I left California.

Q.

Do you remember what day this was?

A.

I think it ~dS the last of July or thereabouts.
exact date.

Q.

Was this all officers on the plane together?

A.

NO, it was mixed. That's the way replacements went over at that time.
There ~ere three artillery battalion commanders on the plane. When
we landed at Pleiku I was expecting it to be hot and raingng. It was
raining but it wasn't hot. As a matter of fact it was so cool I had
1

I don't remember
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to dig down in my du ffle b ag and get out my field jacket. It was wet.
muddy and cold . Not cold , but cool. Of cou rse in the II Corps area, the
elevation ~a9 higher and the temperature cooler. Much cooler than Saigon
or the Delta Area. Most people thought of Vietnam 8S being hot, muggy and
jungle, but mose of our nights were cool in the II Corps area, and if you
were in the mountains. it was downright cold sometimes. But in any event
we landed there , and with all my preparation, which was co n side r able, you

didn't knwo what to expect as far 8S the deployment of the troops , the
enemy situation in that particular area, how the operations were going
to be conducted and how the troops would be dispersed. We got on an army
aircraft and flew from Pleiku to Ankle. Pleiku was in the Northwest past
of the II Corp area and An kle is in the center. We flew over a good
size mountain and the pilot pointed out where the French had a brigade
size unit ambushed and you could still the tanks that had been destroyed.

o.

Were you familiar ' with any of the past history of the conflict between
the Vietnamese and the French?

A.

Yes, not completely. There were a lot of Japs but we had received a
lot of information from the Advanced Officers course at Ft. Sill,
Oklahoma on insurgency and counter-insurgency. We had read everything that you could get your hands on by the authors on the other
side about the a:> nflict.

o.

Were you familiar with the French conduct of the war, their strategy?

A.

We had auite a bit of information about it. We were familiar with
Dienbienphw, how the decision was made to go in there and what the
conseguences were. You didn't have detai l ed information because a
lot of it was coming from the other side. You never know what the h e l l
is going on in a c l osed society like the communists set up. All sorts
of things could be going on and you ,don't know i t . All you do know
is when there is co~tact with the outside world and where that information is coming from. I was selected -to go to the Marine Corp Staff
College and part of the curriculum there was on this type of warfare.
What Y0tl had in that preparation was study groups and each one was g iven
a famous communist author. And he would be responsible for reading
that book and getting the Major ideas out of it and putting them on a
card.

O.

Had you read any French accounts?

A.

Well yes. Ther.'.! were world-wide authors and when a group got together
and exchange information, we were talking about any of the Major
authors who written anything about it . Also we would have the person
from the state department on that deSK, from the major. For example
we had the Intelligence Officer in the State Separtment on that desk
"
and we had them on ~ outheas Asia or South Amer1ca
and along w1th
them you would have the military commander from that area. You would
also have a professor from a nuiversity who had a knowledqe of the
area.
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Q.

So you do feel that you had a certain familiarity, first of all
with the history of the country, you w~re aauainted with the culture .
00 you feel that you had a good knowledge of those two aspects?

A.

Yes I did.

O.

One of the criticisms, not only of the army but our entire country,
was our ignorance of the Vietnamese people and their culture. But
you feel in your case, the army was making an effort.

A.

At my level there was a great deal of knwoledge that was transmitted.
Since then there has been a lot more that has come out that we didn't
have at the time.

O.

Some agree that in many respects the American army repeated the
mistakes of the French army and in that respect we didn't learn very
much, if anything at all, about the mistakes that led to the French
defeat. Are you saying that you did understand the French Military
history?

A.

Oh yes. I didn't have that feeling. Militarily, in the II Corp area,
~e didn't have that much trouble at all.
What I ~as hearing on the
ne~s and ~hat I ~as seeing ~as t~o different things.
We need to comment
on it from letters ~e received from back home. As far as dealing with
counter-insurgency, that's a very difficult theory. The counter~
insurgent has the advantage. It's a simple matter for a small unit,
and there's different phases of an operation, you have to be a~are of
this. If I decide to come in and disrupt Franklin County as an insurgent, it's easier for me to destabilize this county. You could come
in with a platoon and blow up the bridges, knock out the power. disrupt
transportation and po~er, you put the fear of Jesus in all citizens.
and get in the hills and it ~ill take you a long time to find me if
I'm organized, supplied and disciplined ~ith this force. and have
hiding places. You're not going to do it ~ith the local police force
or militia. Espicially if you have open terrain. Most of Vietnam
was, like a _National Park. you could go for miles and miles a nd never
see a soul. YOu could hide a division in those hills. So what I'm
saying is. when Ho Chi M nh said, ~hen he. refused the demand of the
French a reporter asked him ho~ he was going to fight a modern army
~ho also ha~ l,. n air force. he said I have two secret weapons, the
jungle and tbe impatience of the Western mind. And to me that was
exactly what happened in Vietnam. When I ~ent to Vietnam in 1966
at that time, I didn't feel any dissent from the American public.
My hometo~n ~as for me, for winning in Vietnam, There was no particular
dissent expressed at that particular time. They felt like we should
be there , God bless you and good luck. That ~as the send-off I got.

Q.

On the strategy used by the Vietnamese . you can answer that by saying we ~ere unfamiliar ~ith the terrain and the language and we had
an unreliable ally.

A.

Are you talking about the South Vietnamese?

•

-I had quite a bit.

Of course you never get enough.
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O.

Yes.

A.

No.

Would you agree with that?
As a matter of fact, I even resent that evaluation.

It's

overplayed. There were very serious problems with that group of
people, the people of South Vietnan. And Shere were several different
groups, the Montagnards . the Chinese, the outh Vietnamese and also
the large influx coming down from the North. When .they came in there
it was very disruptive. There was an economic and political crisis.
And then you had the insurgents coming in and causing disruption.
Given what they had, I was always amazed at what they did. I looked
at it from an academic point of view. form a personal point of view,
and I looked at i t from a military poing of view, and from talking

with a lot of their high ranking officers.
Q.

Let me put it to you this way then.
ARVNS fought well?

In other words, you thing the

A.

When you talk of it like this, there are two things that cause a unit
to fight well, the state of training and cause. State of training
probably more than the cause because you had mercenaries throughout
history who fought well and they didn't give a damn about the cause.

Q.

Do you think they fought well?

A.

Yes. One of the most efficient battles I saw was fought by the ARVIN
unit that fought with us at Bong Song, near Ple iku. And I was wi~h
the brigade commander often becaue he worked with our brigade. r~ '
that particular operation, I believe it was before LZ Bird, which was
a famous battle in our area. A North Vietnamese reg ime nt attacked
one or our landing zones ,near Quinhon in early 1967. They attacked
after midnight and it ran till next morning. In that process there
was just a company of our infantry who formed a perimeter around one
artillery unit. That's how we operated. That's one of the difference s
between that and Korea. I'll go on with that battle and I'll tell you
aboout eol~nel Long in a minute, the former North Vietnamese who had
migrated South and and had become a brigade commander. In any event
at LZ Bird they had penetrated that perimeter and were about boverrun it and one of the problems was that the weather was bad and
visability ~l~ almost zero. But our helicopter pilots came to the
rescue and t,~arby artillery units were providing support. Of course
there was no communication with the point so it was up to the
helicopters to provide most of the support. They were flying in
weather that was dangerous and finally toward the very end, we had a
new artillery round that had metal flashettes. It would be like
having an artillery round two feet feet long and four inchea around
filled with nails, that were designed to fly through the a i r with the
point first. It would go out like a cone. It was either the first
or second time that round had been fired in combat. They had overrun
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almost all of the artillery positions and one of the artillery captains
hollered to get down, I'm going to fire thia round. Of course you lowered
the tube to ground level. Your target is anything that is moving on the
ground, and when he fired this round, at that time there were all
kinds of noises -from small arms fire, from movement, shouting. When he
fired that flashette everything went silent. He told me it ~as eerie,
because it went from all sorts of noises to silence. In any event that
stopped the battle. I got there shortly after d~yliqht the next morning
and there must have been over two hundred dead Nor t.h Vietnamese. By
the t~e I got there our boys had been evacuated and there had been about
seventy killed and several ~ounded. They almost overran one ~hen I ~as ther
but that ~as the closest they came. There ~as a large size force in that
area and ~e kne~ there was before that happened. We ~ere operating ~ith
the ARVN unit that was responsible for the defense of that zone. And of
course, you had different type units. You had the local militia, the
ARVNS. In this case ~e ~ere trying to find them and it ~as difficult to
find them . We ~ere deploying forces and anducting air mobile operations.
An air mobile operation is a fast moving operation reauiring a . lot of
co-ordination because y ou have all types of organizations and activities
participating. If you want me to I'll give you an example of ~hat I'm
ta lking al:o ut.
O.

Are these the Eagle Flights?

A.

Eagle Flights were similar , but we didn't- call them that.

O.

I'd like to bring you back to where you talked about the i n surgency
situation, that type of tactic. The American response was the search
and destroy tactic. How did you evaluate that? Was it effective?
Was it the most effective way the army had to meet this insurgency?

A.

In the immediate area of operation, yes. Because it was all we had.
In other words, if I'm limited to Frankfort and they're going to attack
me, what are you ging to do do? You're going to search and try to
destroy them. What are your choices? That's part of it. The other
part ia-to -defend Frankfort. To put a cordon around Frankfort so
nobody can penetrate it. To do that takes thousands of people,. and
you can't hardly do it. Say I wanted to get to a bridge up here. All
I have to do id wait till about two o'clock in the morning ~hen everybody is asleep except the people on outpost and with a surprize
attack one point. I'm only going to have a pIa toon, but even though
you have a division. I'm going to have you outnumbered at that one
point. I'll penetrate that point and get do~n to that bridge and
knock it out and probably get a~ay. I may take some casualties and
may not get out. It all depends on how fast I am and what you run
into accidently and how well the operation ges from both views. So
I'm saying you can take a small force and create a lot of havoc.
You have a big advantage and it doesn't have anything to do with anything else, except maybe numbers and the type of activity that's going
on. You don't have well-trained troops on both sides and that's a fact
of life.

I can do that.
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O.

You're describing very ~el1 what the situation was in Vietnam. I
wanted to go a little bit beyond that. . From your actual experiences
of being in Vietnam at that particular time and seeing this type of
operation, did you think it was being effective?

Was there progress?

Did you have any feelings that this was not going to be the successful
way in the long run to win this war?
A.

The military people, expically the senior officers, were having trouble
with the restraint, understanding that there had to be restraint. TherE
were other dangers and political consideration. Understanding the

political considerations that were coming from the people who were
supposed to be experts in their area, coming from the government side,
the government point of vie~. We got those. Coming from the military
point of vie~, from the experts in the area. We got those. Coming
from the academic community, ~e usually got the opposite vie~.

Q.

Are

A.

Yes, talking about strategy. We are a~are of the fact that one of the
things it takes for insurgency to succeed is for the insurgents to
have hope. The other thing is to have discipline. We know about the
Marxist system, their organization and discipline. The Marxist can
fight. They can get po~er and maintain it. We know how they do that.
We have heard that from people who have come out of Russia, from the
Russians mouth. We have read the litera~ure. We have gotten from
their academic situations in the classroom and we've discussed it at
length. We are not surprised at what the hell is going on is what
I'm saying. We're not all-knowing either. I'm not claiming that.

Q.

Is this while you were there?

A.

Yes, this is while I'm there.

Q.

You're an exception. You're a career army officer. You've been in
Korea and you see the way the army is fighting the war in Vietnam.
What I'm asking you is do you think this is going to win the war ?

A.

I know what you're asking. I'm not going to give you a yes or no
answer. All you people want to oversimplify the war. You can't do
it and the reason you can't do it is because it is a complex thing.
We know and I know, and we've talked about it after that with officers
of the highest level ~ho were on the intelligence desk. What do
guys kno~, what do ~e know, we would compare notes, you see. And
read everythinq you could get your hands on about it. When I was
there, militarily, our unit ~as a crack unit. I mean it ~as a
hellacious fighting machine, that first cav unit. And the search
and destroy tactics, we could do it. And we were hioh\y successful
at it. We had very serious restraints that caused crisis and problems
for us. By the time I got there ~e weren't just fighting the insurqen ts .
we were fighting the orqanized ~rmy or North V~nam. They were there

~e

talking about the strategy?

in force.

We talked to them, I talked to them myself.

Make no bones
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about it , they ~ere there . And they have a sa nc t uary and I ' ve run in to
thi s sanctuary and I ' ll give you some examples. The sanctuary is essential

for the i n surgent.

And the sanctuary is the thing that gives you the

domino effect.
Now the domino is not the thing that gives you the domino
effect that peiple talk about. Where you flip a domino and they all go
down immediately. It's a protected thing. The ineurgent has to have that
area. You can ' t have thousands of insurgents and the North Vietnamese
army in there without an area to store a lot of bullets and beans.
You're talking about big activities a nd you can't hide those things . We
ran into this several times. I got there one yea r after the major
infiltration, when the war bad changed . The public wasn't aware of that
and a lot of them thought the military was lying about it.

Q.

About what?

A.

About the nature of the change in the Vietnam war at that time.

Q.

You're saying that the Americans were restrained from
sources and depots of dupplies of t he North Vietnam?

A.

That ' s just part of it.

O.

Would this be in Cambodia?

A.

In the immediate outlying areas.

O.

What were some of the other restraints?

A.

Let me go on with that restraint, that haven area they had. They
also had that area to get back to, to regroup , refit and replenish.
The first major battle that the First Air Cav got into was shortl y
after they got there in 1 965. The North V~namese · thought we would
go in t here and take them on.
So they massed their forces and the First
Cav came running. And to make a l ong story short, with the air mobi l e
concept the First Cav was able to move their forces en mass, attack one
one . of. their regimental forces and dest r oy it then move to another one
and another one before they could mass their forces together so they
would hav e enough combat power to destroy an American division. And
in that process they went right across the border, this happe ned riqht
on the Cambodian border . They went across the border and refitted
in time and came back.

O.

The americans are chasing them , they run across the border and the
Americans stop. There's a restraint.

A.

Right.

That's a major restraint.

~ttacking

the

It might be Laos or Cambodia .
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O.

Of course you know, if I could lead you on this way, another restraint
was the supplies that the North Vietnamese were receiving from China
and the Soviet Union. And the restraint there was that the American
military were forbidden to go into
North Vietnam and seal off.
first of all the Chinese bcir4er and also close down Haiphong Harbor
where a lot of supplies came in. Thag's another restraing, isn't it?

A.

Yes. I'm going to tell you how I felt, how the emotions effected me.
You're sitting at a landing zone called Oasis and you're only ten to
fifteen miles from the border. And intelligence builds up, you're
getting information they're massing up their division and that they're
going to attack somewhere in this area. But one night's march from
where you are sitting, they are sitting over there safe . And you're
concerned about yourself, supporting the infantry, your artil~ry unit.
the men's welfare , about their security . And you are thinking that
those bastards are going to come across that border and wipe us out.
We were searching for them in that area, which was about ~he size of
three counties. In one operation rignt on the border, we had air
assaulted into position. We had a platoon size force and the North
Vietnamese swept acrOBS that border and almost wiped them out. We
called in artillery support and that's all that saved them. And the
NVA go back across that border. And we have rules of engagement and
one of them is that you can ' t pursue them across the border with forces.
You can with fire support. I was the fire support co-ordinator for
the brigade,that was one of my additional doties. So I was work i ng
with the Brigade Commander, the 5 - 3 and the Air Force. The commander
wanted to pursue them with fire across that border. We didn't have
the authority to do it at that l evel so I had to call II Corps t o
get permission. But they did g i ve us permission and I directed fire
over the border. 1 can' t see them but I fire where I think they are.
I ' m firing eight inch artillery, 105 howitzers and l5 5 's. And I'm
firing a lot. You're limited to your range and I suppose we were
firing about a mile in there, maybe less .

O.

You were in charge of how many?

A.

At that particular time I had my own battilion plus about two more i n
reinforcement. At that time I'm thinking that our troops are right
down there on the border and they're bringing them out in ponchos.
You're aware that they can run across that border and kill you and then
run back. That sanctuary gives them two things, it gives them that
logistical base, a place to refit, and safety . I can pursue them wi th
fire just for a short period of time. They are back home and safe.
So, another thing an insurgent has to have is hope because it's g o ing
to be a long , painful, dangerous ordeal for the •• That ~as one of t h e
things they were getting eventually from us t~t hurt us. Any prote s t,
and they ~ere keenly aware of it. They ~ould have plans to start
an offensive on a certain date, and some political incident would
happen in the Unites States and they would change their plans. The y
were getting the conservation. And they ~ere getting hope from t hat.
But one of the bi9gest thinqs. and I under.~ood ~~~ ~r€hrr~traint. were
in there, I wouldn t even say that I wouldn t ag
.
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~roops?

O.

Why did we restrain our

A.

Your fear of expand i ng the wa r . You're trying to limit the ~ar .
You don t ',.know what the Chinese attitude is going to be or what they
are going ~ do. This is no time to be fighting the Chinese on the
Mainland of China.
I

Q.

You understood this?

A.

Yes. From a military point of view you don't need to b e doing this .
As it turns out I don't think the Chinese were ready. 'I~ was probabl.y

like Korea if we had crossed a certain line it might have created a
reaction . We made so~ big mistakes that we didn't have to make,
that wouldn't have endangered that e x pansion. And I'm pretty keen1y
aware of it and I'll give you an example. We made it known for politica
purposes that we were not going to invade North Vietnam. I think it
was more for political purposes than to assure China . We had no
business doing that because that released all their forces in the
North to infiltrate to the South, with some limitations. Because
when they came down the Ho Chi Minh trail we did bomb the hell out
of them . They did take sorre casualties.

o.

This was a mistake?

A.

It was a mistake to tell them that because we felt those forces
immediately. They were coming down there in droves. Now, if we don't
tell them. • .

O.

What do you mean by "Tell them?"

A.

You say we're not going to invade North Vietnam. I'm the commander of
North Vietnam. I've got to look at the military situation and evaluate
it and I've got to say what is the threat and what is the capability
of the other guy and what do I have. If I have a major border that
I've got to have forces there to defend in the event of an amphibious
ass~ult? I~ve got to have a larqe force there to defend against this
threat.

O.

That's a mistake . You put this decesion against the assessment not
to cross this border. You're saying the rea s on we did all this was
this China threat. How could you reconcile the two of them, restraint
so as not to enlarge the war along with threats to invade the North?

A.

If you should invade and it becomes clear that you intend to destroy
North Vietnam's fighting force and occupy the entire area, that's
another thing that would recnuire a response from the other side,
China and Russia. That's a different ballgame from the fact that you
may do it . In other words, you don't have to respond with whether or
not you mayor may not do it until the event occurs. Until it
becomes a threat or a reality. Then you have to do something . When
we said we're not going in there it freed their combat forces and
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made a big change in their
was mostly political.

combat power in . the south.

I think it

Q.

What made it political?

A.

The impatience of the Western mind beginning to mobilize a political
force to threaten the person in power. Some of their decisions were
made to address the political ramifications. And in that process there
were two problems for the military. It made us fi. ght more people and
it gave them hope.

Q.

I'm not disagreeing. I think that it's a valid point that our forces
had to fight under severe handicaps. Every war is political, what's
in the back of mind,and you might be thinking the same thing. is
that there was the American leaders and the military for that matter,
were conditioned to think that the Chinese might come across that
border because you remember what happened when MacArthur sent his
forces up to the Yalu. And there had been his promise that the
Chinese would not come into the war and they did. I think that there
was a determiniation by the American government that they didn't want
to repeat that mistake.

A.

That's valid. I don't have any problem with that.
With hindsight I think we could have gone'.

o.

You're saying you would have taken the gamb1e?

A.

I think on the sanctuaries on the border .

Q.

I think what you are saying is a clear explanation of the frustration
that was generated in American military leaders that they're having
to fight these wars under restraints. Number one the Cambodian
sanctuaries and number two, no American forces can cross over into
North Vietnam. That was the rules of the game that we set for ourselveE
which Obvi~usly favored the enemies tactics. A lot of the men that
were in Vietnam , the grunt, the GI, complain. He resented the
restraints the same way his officers did. Somehow or other we came
to fight a war that put him under these handicaps and he came to
resent it. They felt a tremendous amount of frustration.

A.

It's a chess game.

And we did later on.

When I was there the morale of our fighting forces was very high.
The effeciency of the mil itary operations was exceeding'.y good,
I'll give you some examples, and I'm speaking of one period of history
August 1966-August 1977. At that time, let me just give you an example
of what happened to me, and sane of the things that were said and done.
I go into Ple iku , An khe. An khe is the biggest heli-pad in the
world at that time. There were 400 or more helicopters in that area
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then, it's a circular area, it's a large area. It's kind of like a
city. rt haa a division force in it, it has quonsut huts and bunkers.
It's nice, it has clubs for the men and the officers. But ~e're not in
there most of the time, we're out in the jungles. But that's our base.
It's kind of like wholesale as far as logistics are concerned.
Things come in there first and then they send them to us out in the fie~d.
We're operating in an area as big as several Kentucky counties. We're
operating on t~e Cambodian border and we're operating on the China coast
in between that area.

We may be on the China coast one day and the
Cambodian border the next. I've done that. I come in 8S a new batall.ion

commander and I'm
skilled in several areas. I'm skilled as an artilleryman, I'm skilled as an artillery commander. I'm skilled as a fire-support
co-ordinator, I'm skilled in tactics at the small unit level and at the
major unit area. I've had all that training and schooling. I've fired
a lot of artillery rounds so I understand that. But this air mobile
thing is new to me. So to acquaint me and the new batallion commanders,
this is an unfortunate thing of course this rotation, because we almost
got a new division when I came in there. It's hard to fathom that big.
Tape II
Side 1
A.

When you're fighting with spears it's one kind of formation, when the
machine guns came in it was one kind of formation. In fighting with
thi Indians there were different formations. Korea was es~entially
a World War II type action where you were roped down and where you
moved by vehicle and foot and where there was generally speaking but
not always, and the situation was different there so you have to be
careful how you speak for Korea in totality. For when they first
invaded there we put a task force Smith there, it was just a battalion
and they were facing the whole North Vietnam army. We had one of them
there at the University that was captured. the geography teacher, John
Gardner. For them, they're out there all alone in an island and then
you . had~he cusan perimeter and at that time the state of the training
of the army was almost zero because they'd demoblized and eauipment was
in bad shape.

O.

But you could look at a map of Korea that you see in History books
now and there would be the Cusan perimeter, then came the
landings along with the in-run by MacArthur and then you'd see another
map and there the American forces had moved up the Korean peninusla
back to capture _ . . .
__ __ , so that becomes the front line.
So you can see three or four maps that would be a typical history
story of the Korean war, then the line ~uld move up and up until it
finally got to the yellow river and then eventually there would be
the counter-attacking.
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A.

Well not q u ite.

I

~as

trying t o use that to make a poi n t, the point

is that the
landing, the front eventually collapsed. The North
Vietnamese began to get out of there and not in good order. So then
there was a p u rsuit. There was a pursuit by the tent corp, by the
eighty army and by the Rock Corps and in that process when they passed
the forty-eighth parallel the r e was not a continuous run across the
peninsula.
Q.

Yes. but there was a front.

A.

No, some of those maps and newspapers won't tell you the story. all
I'm saying is that you'd have one arm going up one coast and one going
up another and there would not be any forces going in between them.
There ' d be voids and gaps.

And when the Chinese hit they were in

between Borne of those forces, they were south of 9Om~ of those forces
and there were some perimeters being formed in the Northern area.
So, there wasn't a continuous front across but the difference was the
force was there and you could see them and you were in contact with
them. I mean not initially , the Chinese were there a long time before
we came in contact with them. But there was a front end' it was
continuous. It would stay from day to day , the contacts in Vi etnam
were sporadic and non-continuous . So. that's a big difference and th e
second big difference was that you moved mostly, you were much more
mobile in Vietnam. The targets were fleeting, the enemy was in and o ut.
Q.

In Korea y ou knew who were the good Koreans, who were the bad Koreans .
You knew Who was on your side, you could depend on the Korean army
that was fighting with you to defena their country, which you couldn't
really do in Vietnam.

A . . Eventually in Vietnam there was ' a force coming dwon there just like
there was . It was a force moving in mass at the very end.
Q.

I've nev er seen any maps of the fighting of the Vietnam war which wou l d
say, nowhere the area at this particular point when Colonel Kell y
moves in in 1966 and this is what we defended and a year later this is
what we defended .

A.

That's the difference in the wars.

Q.

yes , that is a difference. NoW, here ' s the auestion, do you think that
the charge is true that it's typical of the Generals to fight the war
they're in the way they had fought the previous war?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

You do know, for example, that that's the way the French were anticipa ti r
fighting World War I . They remembered the Franco-Russian war and t h e
effectiveness of the Calvary and so forth and they didn't take into
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account, in World
tanks and so forth.

WaS

I, the new technology of the machine guns and the
0, they were slow.

Then when World War II comes

along you find the French Army not able to respond to the new tactics of
the Germans 90 they're fighting world war I instead of World War II. It's
generally thought,by the critics anyway, and I just want to get your
reaction to it, that the American command was using the tactics of the
Korean war in attempting to fight the Vietnam war.
A.

NO, and not only that they knew the difference. As far as the way
those people were operating. I mean we knew the difference before we
went in there and it doesn't matter how you're fighting, if you're
fighting Indians with bow and arrows or what you're fighting, eventually
the contact comes it's manuvering fire and it's ~ho has the most
at the point of contact at the critical time and ho~ you get there and
if you're at the right plnce, is part of the military mission and task.

~hen

o.

Some have said that if we'd had more . .

A,

Well, who said that?

o.

Well, I'll give you all kinds of sources of that. I guess the major
source that I find most credible is the book by Colonel Harry Summers
Called ____ ~. _ _ __ ~tra~esy _ and that's the impression I have received
from reading his book.

A.

His is a good book, I've read it sone.

o.

Yes. He may not be putting it ouite as bluntly as I have Qut he seemed
to feel that maybe we needed different command 'leadership at the top.
that specifically West Marlen was ~edded to this search and destroy
strategy, progress ~ould be dertermined by body count and that he
persisted in this long after it ~as realized that this ~as not
effective.

A.

So, what did he say the choices were?
~ar essentially.

O.

Okay, the military kne~ what the constraints ~ere and ~e've gone over
all of those and Summers says ' okay ~e've got to ~ork on the restraibts '
Now of course he does not attempt to offer what he thinks we should have
done as much as ~hat he goes over. as a historian is, ~hat ~a 's the
command and the politicans and the military in the administration. what
~ere they recommending and the alternative which ~as not followed out
was some kind of. like the DMZ line the strategy ~ould have been
effective if . there had been a defense line across all of South Vietnam
held by the Americans and then the ARVN ~ould be turned loose to
destroy the Viet Congo

The choices were expanding ·the
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&.

I looked at it hard, the
They had a contract together, research
they had sociologist, It ~a9 in Columbus, a real famous place. they
invented the Xerox. They're still operating. Some guy left them a
fortune for ·a trust fund. They gathered information from all sources,
compiled, consolidated, analyzed and we had access to it and I went to
it when I was at Limited World Labratories. At Limited World Labratory
I was studying from a technical point of view -- from the technical
problems of solving it. And whether it was storing rice or wheat or
even from an economic point of view to some extent and we had experts
selected from all disciplines. The sociologist, the human behavoralist
expert, the biologist, the chemist, the physicist, optics, engineering
fields covered.

O.

What was their objective?

A.

Their objective was to solve the technical problems. auickly.

O.

Of the search and destroy?

A.

Of Vietnam, not search and destroy .

O.

But they had to apply this to that?

A.

Yes, that was part of it.

o

You say that was the major?

A.

Yes that was probably most of it. All I'm saying is they looked at
the line and John, from a tactless point of view it's like I'll give
you two divisions and if .you can keep me from coming into Frankfort
I'll buy you a steak dinner. You can't do it.

O.

Apparently that's what they said at the time and one of those that
proposed it was Macnamara.

A.

I know it.

O.

It COUldn't have been more expensive could it than what they were doing?

A.

Oh yes.

O.

Well, the cost in terms of your results

A.

Well , if it was a hundred percent fine, stick it across there and pay
for it, but I'll gurantee you you couldn't do it and not only that
you ha!l the Cambodian thing, in other words if you cou'_d have extended
it over

And it would also be expensive today.
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O.

All you want to do i . keep them out of the South.

A.

That's what I'm telling you, you've got a whole coastline

O.

Well see you would have cut off that Hoo Chi Minh trail.

A.

No, you wouldn't. If you cut off the Hoc Chi Minh trail they'd move
it to the next one
You can't do it, I mean you couldn't box that
thing in. You couldn't put a wall like the wall around China.

John.

4

Q.

Well. it's not auite the same.

A.

You couldn't it, you still can't do it. Now I tell you one thing.
they'd have a lot more trouble trying to operate in the jungle now
then they did then, with the technology we have.

Q.

To move large numbers of North Vietnamese across the lines, you know
company strength .

A.

They don't move in company strength. They infilterate. You know,
you dig under it John, you just dig a tunnel, you know it takes you
forever to do it and you don't care that it takes forever. You just
keep digging and digging and digging.

O.

One of the strengths of this strategy we're talking about is that it
would have given the Ameri can army a mission, it would hav.e also
given the ARVN a clear cission and they would have been able to perform
a bot better. This is an arguement now, obviously they knew the
lnaguage, they knew who the enemy was and would have been able to
identify and move against them more effectively than the Americans
ever could. So they would have had the sense then of defending
territory, or defending their own land and probably would have been
more motivated than the way it turned out.

A.

I' 1.1 tell you John, in South America today. that sanctuary is what
we're going to get with Nicarauga and El Salvador, and that's going to
give them the power to move it, North and south, and it will be
moved. And it won't be done over night. It'll be protracted, and if
it isn't dealt with, then eventually you're going to have a mass movement of people into North America and it's going to be a serious
crisis for us.

O.

And to you this is one of the lessons of Vietnam?

A.

That's the lesson. The lesson of Vietnam is that the domino theory
is not a precise enough definition, but the things that it takes.
First of all it takes the doctrine that offers a change and hopefully
betterment and a discipline and then it takes forces, and it takes
in the evolution of this force business, money and support from large
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Nations that have to have resources to that extent. You have to Stockpile the stuff, you have to have the base, the base is critical and ~hen
you get the base and you get the sanctuary and you have the discipline
and you have the gun, then you can create havoc, destabilization. In
the destabilization part of the mission ehe goal is to get a reaction that
causes people to turn against the people that are there and in that
process too, corruption becomes more and more acute. rnu al~aY9 have
corruption in any government because of the corruptible nature of man.
So with that destabilization you get more corruption, and you get a turning
of the heads away from the major problems. They get to concentrating on
the response. In other words the doctorine is to get a response that causes
people to go out and have
or whatever and this creates
lack of confidence of the . ~eople in power. of protecting them and also
fear of them, eventually. So, it's sort of a ram robin, it's a very
serious thing, it wouldn't be serious if communism was a good idea, if
democracy was not a good idea, if liberty and freedom were not' important
things it would not make any difference. But because it is then it's a
crisis. Have you read this last book written about China called ~rQ~e ~
Earth, the author was a sociologist on the early exchange that got to
go to China and he was one of the few. if not the only one, that got to go
out into a province and operate without being directed as to where he
could go, withoug being limited to where he could go. In 1980-91. He
does a good job of painting the evils of living under that system. one of
the big things of course that you're getting out of it is you're getting
a bigger bureacuracy. It practically controlls everything in your l i fe.
You can have two kids and after that you're told to have an abortion and
on and on. You want to get your drivers liscense you have to go to t hree
or four different places and you have to pay some people. Corruption
becomes more rampant there than it is i n a democracy because you ha ve
more people influenced.
Q.

There may be some disagreement on whether those that we're supposed
to be defending in Vietnam or El Salvador believe themselves to be
a democracy. I have a lot of auestions about that. But I think the
basic point you're making is that it is a threat. We don't want
communism in the Western Hemisphere . I wanted to come back to the
Vietnam experience once more and sya to you that I' v e heard constant ly
the viewpoint of soldiers who served in Vietnam that the reason we
lost was the politicians wouldn't let the Generals fight the war.

A.

Well that's an oversimplification and you can't do that anyway.

Q.

Then why is it that they believe this? When you say it's an oversimplif-l,catlon you're saying that these people have a simple unders t anding of what you and I would consider a very complex matter, why are
they persistant in believing in this oversimplification. I hear t his
consta'ntly . Who's to blame?
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A.

Well first of all people feel bad if there's a failure, that's one
of the problems.

a,

Well, I 'm ta·lking about the men who fought in Vietnam.

A.

Well, you're going to get a reaction, and then the second thing
and the threat continues and it moves and it grows.

o.

What amazes me is the experiences of vietnam did not destroy their
faith in the military. They just felt that the military as a whole was
frustrated by the politicians that if they had to do it over again,
many of them Bay they'd do it and many of them are still in the
reserves, they're still very patriotic and they have not lost their
faith in the military. So, in looking for an explanation of why we
lost they blame the politicians. But as you say it's oversimplified.

A.

I think with some accuracy you can say that the political pressures put
on the administration and the response to that political pressure was
a response that caused some decisions to be made that should not have
been made in hindsight, that's rather easy to see.

O.

What specifically are you talking about?

A.

Well to bomb or not bomb ia an example.

O.

And all the rest of the restraints. Can I put it to you this way .
This is Summers position and as an army officer he should have some
credibility. and he says that Johnson ran the war. that unlike the
Korean war. unlike World War II. where there was continual almost
daily communication between General Marshall and Roosevelt on the
military strategy of the war, that Roosevelt was listening to the
Generals. It's a historical fact that Roosevelt was close to Marsha 1\.
He made him his secretary of state. So in many ways. though the
president makes the final decisjon he's seeing Marshall and Admiral
King and all the rest of the commands on a daily basis and the same
with Truman and the Korean war. However the access that the American
Generals, West Morlen. the joint chief of staff and all the rest of
them had with Johnson was occasional. This was a war run by the civilis l
There was what they called the Tuedsay Cabinet meeting, and very often
the Generals weren't even invited to the meetings or if they had advisement to give it would be given to Macnamara or somebody on that level
who would then present their views. but they never rea lly had the
opportunity to run the war. Now in a certain way when you stop to
think of that arguement. I think the American GI is right in blaming
it on the politicians. And if the Generals had • • .

A.

It's kind of like a football game though.

O.

Well. we're seeking for answers. right?
oversimplified.

W8S-

So, maybe it's not auite
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A.

I would say there is an element of truth in there but I would be
hesitant to turn it over to the military.

Q.

I'm not !Oing to that extreme. The arguement here is more co -ordins ticn
more direct contact. Such as, For example, Reagan today •

A.

That was one of the points I was trying to make awhile ago, that
political pressure was primary, and I can't say with absolute assurance
that this is so, but from what you can read and what you can gather
and what you can discern and infer, political forces were causing
military decisions on both sides . . •

Q.

What do you mean both sides?

A.

The communist, the North Vietnamese.

In other words they were respond-

ing to these political forces there and General Story talked about
that to some length, I cau't remember the specifics.
O.

What point are you wanting to make

A.

The point, the thing occuring in the United States. a demonstration
or something. casuing plans to be changed by the communist, in order
to maximize political support in the United States against the war.

O.

I would like to keep the focus , in this part of the conversation, on
the point that I'm making that Roosevelt and the Generals got along
fine, Truman and the Generals, Reagan sees this General Vessey everyday.

A.

Truman and the Generals didn't get along fine either.

O.

But you know it is true that Johnson fought this war, that he made the
strategy, he was the one who put those targets on there and said this
is what you do. He made all the decisions.

A.

Yes. more so that the.

O.

To the extreme that he all but had the Generals shu out.

A.

Yes and perhaps to the extreme. On the other hand too, in the Korean
war, you know Bradley let McArthur, when he was the chairman of the
joint chief of staff, have more freedom than he in hindsight would
have given him and regretted it. And MacArthur made some serious
tactical errors.

O.

Some very serious ones, which goes to show you that if you let a
General go unbridled • . .

A.

After the highly successful
be regretted that he didn't
exercise more control. However he appreciated while he was in
Europe that Marshall wasn't telling him how to manage the battlefield so there ~ some need for reorganization in the government to
account for the new problems and dangers that are there because of
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the nuclear capability and because of the gurellia war.
O.

Do you know what Summer says? If this was the situation with the
Generals being shut Qut, why didn't the Generals protest. why didn't
they, if they knew that what Johnson was doing, was not going to win
the war, why didn't they resign? Now, this is Summers. That's their
responsibility, this is the high command, this is the West Morlen and
that group. The joint chief of staff. That's an interesting point
isn't it.

A.

To an extent but who had a clearcut idea on how to solve a problem.

O.

Well Johnson thought he did.

A.

No, he didn't.

I don't think

90.

Well what was the problem, to prevent the comrnjnist f~m ta~ i ng over
South Vietnam. Of course what Johnson was doing in some aspects was
repeating the mistakes of Truman or what turns out to be the mistakes
of Truman in the Korean war, that the American people aren't going t o
accept committed war. This holding the line business just does not g o
down. Truman leaves in 1 953, he was very unpopUlar. people had
turned against t he war, Eisenhower says, I'll go to Korea . . .
Tape II
Side 2

Q.

-

A.

Well their hooks are on the ground and I'm concerned that they're going
to be damaged and cut off that vital resource so I made the decision.
On the artillery I' ve got three choi ces, leave it on the ground, fire
it up or try to blow it up and I do have maybe an engineer section
there that has the skills to do it. But it's dangerous and it's hard
to do so I made the decision to fire it up and I fire it out at the
maximum rate of f i re and get it out of there in short order. I make
arrangements to land at LZ Oasis ann the meantime sort of a Typhon
comes through there and water and rain is everywhere. This came al l
of a sudden , it had been a pretty sunshiny day . It's a downpour-monsoon. Before it comes the clouds fill up and it's almost dark.
I'm looking around at that and I'm concerned about that and then I
sent
, I said go find us a place to go. We decided to go into
LZ Oasis. I told him to find us an artillery position and to make
arrangements at the other end to get them in as they come. From
this end I was getting them out, heading them back that way and
he's getting them in

Q.

Who was th i s getting them in?

A.

My 5-3. Well actually. not the 5-3 at that time. I got another uni t
from another battalion to do it. My 5-3 is still at the rear, he' s
still at the re~desvous area . I got a call from him, he's supposed t o
be coming in there and he says, you know a funny thing happened. Jus t
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as the hooks came in to pick us up , they turned around and took off. In
other ~ord9 you move in an
as you go on these things . You hav~
a j ump control , fire direction center and I went in with the jump control
center and my operations officer stayed back near Pleiku in that general
area, where we s t arted from and they were supposed to pick him up and
bring him into that area where I'd gone forward. And he should have been
in there pretty soon to help co-ordinate all these other activities.
O.

In this LZ Oasis area you were going to, right? The picture I see
then, is this, it's about s i x o'clock and it ' s starting to rain
heavily and darkness is coming on and all the hook's are on the ground
and you' re firing off art.illery to get rid of the ah"lls and then you're
getting ready to pullout and then this guy , your S-3 calls you and wha t
did he tell you?

A.

He tells me a funny thing happened, just as the hooks were coming in
they turned around and took off . What they were doing was' responding
to my order to ge t me some hooks and he was getting them wherever
he could get them and he took them from t he one's that were scheduled
to pick up my 5-3.

O.

So that's why he wasn ' t with you, because the hooks never landed t o pi ck
him up because your orders were to come to you.

A.

My orders were to get me some hooks, I didn't know where he was g oi ng
to get them but he got some of them form me, some not all. Some o f
t hem came from other places too . That left out a vital part of my
organization.

Q.

Now where should he have been?

A.

He would have been coming in t h ere wi th me and t hat would have b ee n
putting more people in there to co- ordiante the f i re and the cont in uatio l
bf the assault into the general area.

o.

Do you remember this fellow, this 5-3?

A.

No, because he left shortly thereafter . He was a good one. So then ,
as I get the last one down in the next area it ' s dark and I'm concerned
about getting out of there before it gets dark. Now later on I do ge t
to where we can move at night because we have a contingency where we
might have to go out and reinforce one of those little special forces
defensive zones area or fortress. But at this time I never though t
aboHt it and it is dangerous. Watching those polots come in there, the
skill that they had t o ge t in those formations and get in that t ight,
it was impressive. And also the skills tnat ' those artillery men
operated in getting all those things done was mind boggling. By
darkness we were in the other position and when you get in there you'v e
got to try to un sort things and find out what is going on. At t h a t
time there was a lot of firing going on around that LZ, on the per i meter
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Machine guns going off, and pings and artillery were being fired. At
this time the co-ordination of the fire is with the other Brigade and
I'm just primarily getting my unit in. But in this process also, my
S-3 says to me, and I need him, I've got plans and I don't know what's
going to happen the next minute and its a vital part of my operation to
provide support, and he says to me, what'l! I do, he'd been there awhile
and I said what do you suggest, and he said I think we can make it by a
road movement. You see, it's not a combat formation, it's mostly a headquarters and I'm very concerned about ambush and I said do you know the
roads, are you familiar with them. He said, yes. Do you know the general
situation between here and there? He said, I think so. I think we can
do it.
O.

How many people is he going to hl ve with him?

A.

Oh, he's going to have thirty. He said I recommend that we move by
road. I am at a point of decision, there's danger, there's danger of
IJot getting him where he ought to be, there's also danger of leading
him out there because it's gitting down to where he's about the only
thing left there, there's not much security left for him at that end.
And it's very dangerous, moving h i m on the road. There is an element
of surprize, they don't expect you, you could just luckily, haphazardl y
you might drive right by them before they realize you're going. But,
if you happen to be moving as you go there, they 'may take it as a target
opportunity and eng~ge it or they might be afraid of it and keep moving .
So, I'd just got through doing that with the ammunition, so I said
mov e it. Well the next day the Brigade commander , the division
artillery commander came to se me. They'd talked about it at higher
levels. They said, Kel,ly shot up all the ammunition and he moved t he
force on the road. Dangerous.

O.

They were critical, they didn't like what you did ?

A.

Well, he came to find out, of course their heads are all turned the
other way. He walks up to me and he said, why did you shoot up all
the ,ammunition. I said, well, here's the situation. Three choices,
shoot it, leave it, or try to destroy it and maybe not get it done,
and at some risk to the engineers being the last to come CUlt and
with the problem of co-ordinating it without shooting down our helicopters or something else. Without shooting up our own forces. I d i d
control that see, and he said that's the right decision, I'd have done
the same thing myself. Then he said how did you move your forces on
the road. I said same explanation I just gave you. He said, risk but
right.

O.

It did work then?

A.

Yes.

O.

What you're also saying is this Colonel really had contro l of the

They did make it?

We were in fighting formation and ready to provide support .

situation, he knew what was gOing on all the time.
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A.

He

what was going on in the other area primarily.

Q.

But somebody was giving him this information about your decision?

A.

Oh yes.

O.

Well, how did it get around?

A.

Well, they have
~~__ ~ . people out there and they go back in and
have ii!l tactical operations center and every~hin9 comes into that informaticn center.

Q.

Did you have to report your decision? You made two decisions, one on
this ammunition and one on this 5-3, so how did that get out to them?
You didn't tell them did you?

A.

No, I was too busy.
there are .__ _ _ _

Those things are getting around.

He got it before I reported it. But 'l ike I say.
people out there and they report back t o the i r

commanders and these commanders and staff officers . espically staff ·
officers primarily, go into the tactical operations center and al l the
heads are comi ng together and communications are coming from everywhere.
Q.

There'~

A.

Yes, it's probably been reported to several people and they're wonder i ng
about it. Because they knew I was out there and they knew I had some
problems and they were probably wondering how I was doing. But t heir
heads were all tu~ned to the live target, so to speak.

Q.

So now you're in this new landing zone.

A.

Now I'm in there and that's t he way I started off .

Q.

And this was your birthday?

A.

That was my birthday and also my first day in combat.

Q.

How old were you then?

A.

That was in 1966 and I was born in 1925, so I was forty-one.

Q.

You won't forget that birthday.
any number of times?

A.

We never had a change of direction while in air. We changed from t he
East Coast to the West Coast and from the West Coast t o the East Coas t
and to where you were supporting extractions and lifting out and depopulating, taking out your c ombat power and moving it ov er to another
force.

Q.

You were there for a year.

somebody in your group

~ho ' s

reporting this ?

Tell me did you do this type opera t io n

How often did you do that?
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We

~ere

A.

Constnatly, almost.
time.

out in the operations almost all the

Q.

Chasing the enemy then?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How effective do you think that all of that was, when you look back on
it now? What effect did this have on the course of the war. You1re
chasing the enemy, you make your contact, there is some fighting. Does
this give you a sense of just accomplishment. You're defeating the
enemy, you 're wearing him down or what? Is that the way you felt

Brigades would rotate in and go back to
responsible for the defense of that.

and be

about it?

A.

Well, you can't put it in prospective at that particular point in time.
As far as going in that _ __ ___ _ and taking out that NV force we
could do i t and did it, did it effeciently. As a matter of fact there

a New Zealand Lieutenant Colonel that ~a9 observing higher operatio n
at Paul Revere II. After it ~as over the Brigade had gone bace to Omkei
and he ~a9 a guest at the officers mess. He was a very professional
military person, had been through all the appropriate schools and so
forth and he was leaving and we were syaing goodbye to him, be 'd kind
of been to different headquarters out in our area and he got up and said
I want to tell you that this has been a very enlightening experience
for me and he said the respect that I have for that unit. the first
CAV division, can't be put into words, he said I can't imagine a
training base that's so effective that you can train all · these
specialties. throw them together as you all did and jump off on a
major military operation with that precision.
~as

Q.

He was tremendously impressed wasn't he?

A.

He

Q.

did you get our of it. Did you gain control over anymore terr itory
or did you think that you had killed a lot of the enemy and that was
warranted. what you did?

A.

If he came into an area and threatened an are we could destroy him and
get him out, he'd come back. Now we're not going to know to what extent he's going to be able to reinforce and for how long.

Q.

So you go after him. you hit him. he leaves?

A.

Well, in many cases he'd go across, depends on ~here he ~as. You see
John. you haye to be very careful about the way you speak for the
whole thing.

~as

impressed, I was too.

Wha~
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O.

Well you're here, you're chasing them down and you handle that
artillery and those men in this magnificent impressive way, just
beyond tremendous adverse conditions of the weather and communication.
The tremendous skill of the pilots and the whole thing. It's a
great display of American • • •

A.

Well, the fighting machine was there.
was very effective.

Q.

So, what do you wind up with at the end of the year?

A.

At the end of the year . from the time the first Cav forces had gone
in there orginally a lot of those forces had been taken out of there
and were across the border. So that these tittle villages were
reasonably secure and they could go on about their business. There
were some insurgencies. small unit things in that general group
population where they might come out at night and fight. But generally
speaking you'd see people out in the fields working, working their
crops, harvesting their crops, shieh would be subject to being in
danger by either side coming in and out or tangling in their midst.

Q.

Did you think at the end of your year that we were going to win the war?

A.

No, I didn't feel like.

O.

That there was something else to be done?

A.

Yes I did. Their capability to get out and get back, to replen ish and
refurbish was significant.

Q.

You and others talk about this basically not working despite how
efficient the army was. Was there any talk at all about chanqing the
tactics among your fellow officers, did they realize that something
wasn't working well here or what?

A.

John not that much at that time in history.

Q.

You were still optimistic, generally. that it was going to work out?

A.

Yes, at that level the division had an immediate job. It was to
protect those people primarily from those larger forces, NVA forces.
and it was very difficult to do. Now progress was being made on how
to use thechical means to locate them and I got into that at Limited
World Labratory. It was one of the most complex technical problems
facing our Nation as a scientist told me at Limited World Labrotories.
which I worked there in the Research Development Activity. I had a
job trying to deal technically with those problems in dealing with a
counter-insurgency or an insurgency, The purpose --they brought the
best minds they could from the army and the science community of the
civil service .

And the air mobile ancept
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O.

Well what do you think after your experience, either then or since,

should have been done to change the tactics that could have won the
War? I mean given the restraints, not change the mistakes, not change
going after the sanctuary, but the way you were battlefield, what would

you have done?
A.

Search and destroy was the best thing you had at the moment to clear
the area of hostile forces, that's the only thing you had.

O.

It was not clearing the enemy_

A.

It wasn't completely effective. I'm saying to you there is a
technological problem of locating a dug-in force cameflouged in the
jungle, that is, as a scientist told me, more complex than putting a
person on the moon by far. We tried several techniaues, we tried
electronics, lasar beams, pressure, chemical, on and on. I'm talking
about means of finding out where these guys are. So what you had
was a company formation moving through the jungle and usually the
NVA decided when they were going to engage them and it would be auite
often in an L-shaped formation.

O.

So the initiative was with the enemy?

A.

Yes, and we'd be walking and we'd go right into that thing and they'd
engage us and there'd be heavy casualties there initially. I've got
a paper on it that explains it in some detail and I'll try to get that
for you. Even though they were dug in and would suprise our company,
the company essentially enden up being a target aauisition force.

Q.

What does that

A.

It means locating the enemy, finding him. We had artillery going
with them so to speak, I mean artillery fires, support. A lot of
times we'd have the artillery just kind of leaking down in fron+-, of
them, just a hundred or two hundred yards in front of them as they
mov~d.
-So _if they got hit we'd have . _
__
For
example. one of the company commanders I thought a lot of had gotten
caught in that situation and I don't want him to get killed or hurt
and I'm right there over top of him observing what's going on and
listening to it on the radio and he gra~s the fire observors radio and
a bold hit in artillery which is dangerous when it's that close to you.
And fortunately enough made good judgement so that he pulled it right
back on that line where they were. There was a mortar getting ready
to fire and he said that artillery rammed, looked like ti went right
down the tube, it didn't of course, and destroyed that mortar. It
was done in seconds. Of course when those machine guns go off they're
on the ground and that initial fire gets a bunch of people. Once they
are on' the ground they can take a lot of fire. You can get down . in
and around, and over for protection. Of course you have to keep those
g~ys from maneuvering against them and they do maneuver.
So on their

mean?
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flight position they start a sauatter platoon against their plane and
again he was able to move that artillery right on that movement and knock
them out 90 that seconds are critical.

Q.

This is all a technique that developed out of this and trying to
solve this problem?

A.

Yes. sa then they bring in, I'm bringing in more and more artillery,
that's my job and I'm getting it in there and that's pinning these
people down, and giving him more security and eventually he can get to
where he can move a little bit. Then we start supporting an air
Bssualt and troops come in there and pretty soom we're going to surround
and take those guys and they ' re going to take heavy casualties and
they're going to get out of there-some of them. That was one of the
things that amazed me, how they could get out while we were there.
It was really difficult to do.

O.

First of all, as an Army Officer. you're given your orders that these
are the tactics we're going to use. And you're trying, within the
strategy, to find all kinds of means to make the strategy work. Is
that what you're saying to me?

A.

I'm saying that you've got a problem and you've got resources and tha t ' s
all you've got to do. Unless you do other than and also unless you
bring in technology. And I was going to tell you at Limited World
Labratory there was a lot of progress made in sol ving the locatio n
of these forces. One of them was what we called a people sniffer.

Q.

Did you think t hat i f you had more time then. is that what
saying?

A.

Yes I'm saying that he was correct, that jungle was a secret weapon.
And I'm saying that if you had devices and these devices were making
great progress when I was there and all sorts even biological, bed
bugs, microorganisms.

Q.

What were bed bugs?

A.

A bed bug will detect persons and react. But we COUldn't keep them
alive. And dogs trained to find mines, I mean there were

Q.

Just trying to find these things then?

A.

Yes. Well these operations. There were things going on to solve these
problems and like I say, with time it would get to where it would be
difficult for him to move around in that jungle.

you're
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o~

They say that there was a so called eye and triangle right outside of
Saigon, that the Americans never discov~red in all the time that they
were there, you know that the NVA and the Viet Cong were underground.

A.

Yes there was. They were underground everywhere.
their most vulnerable points.

O.

Did you ever say that well the top command should be doing something
different rather than this particular strategy? Did you ever get to
that point of saying well you 're working your hardest in it to try and
make it work as you're describing it. Did you ever say to yourself
or to others that isn't there some other atrategy that could be tried?
I know there were proposals.

A.

Oh yes.

Q.

For example, there was the whole idea of putting a defense perimeter
from the sea to the Cambodian border . Did you talk about that?

A.

We didn't, we were too busy fighting. we're not going to have time to
think about that.

Q.

I'm talking about. you leave there and you're thinking and all of the
rest of it .

A.

There are things going on see, ideas and searching for ideas and you're
bringing in the best of minds from allover and listening to people.
But the jungle is a serious problem, the sanctuary is a serious
problem and the determination of the Marxist.

O.

That's true. And that was

A.

No it was not underestimated. We knew it was there. We pretty well
knew how they operated and you can see it right now going on ' in El
Salvador.

O.

I've talked to a lot of GI's, the guys that you were ordering to go
on these search and destroy missions. I have a feeling that they were
doing their very best to work hare, good soldiers but what it reall y
came down to was the combination of this rotation system and the search
and destroy missions that for them it was just a matter of personal
survival. They couldn't understand, it was not working, the harassment
of the enemy was very effective in pinning down large numbers of
Americans and they couldn't see any progress, and so the whole from
their perspective was to spend their time and come out of there alive.

~urvival

was one of

They were looked at from every angle.

underestima~ed.
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A.

But of course anybody'd ~ant to do that.
goal ' of everybody in there.

O.

That's a goal of any war. But let me ask you this, it became the
overriding objective. I mean there wasn't anything in the way of
we're going to win this. what they were saying was we're not fighting
to win, we're fighting to live.

A.

No, not when I was there. I think it carne later. To what degree. it
kind of depends on the leadership, the organization, and the state of
the training. During those anti-war things and when the political
diciaions were made to where there was doubt, I always wondered how
they did hang in there.

To come out alive is the

When I was there morale was high and the combat

efficiency was exceedingly high. And I think it was beyond even what
you'd expect it to be. See, by this time the guys thet are going over
there have seen all this stuff in here. They were--Kent was there at
this later stage and also the drug thing had got to be a problem in
the military, when I was there it wasn't there.
Q.

I have found that ta lking to the fighting men, those who were in the
combat area that even at the height drugs were minimal. They realized
that the worst thing they could do was to be stoned. that they were goin~
to come out in a poncho.

A.

I think that's probably true.

Q.

And they claim that most • •

A.

The availability out in the jungle too was a problem.

Q.

Yes, but it was at a minimal amount because they knew that would just
endanger their survival. Most of ~em said that Where the drugs took
place was off the ling, in the rear areas.

A.

In the rear areas, Saigon and places like that, yes.

O.

Of course I've talked only so far, with a small number of men. I want
to change the subject a little bit. You were in Korea, how woulj youWhat are the basic differences between the Korean fighting, the strategy
we used in Korea and those that you encountered in Vietnam?

A.

Well it's not even.
It's not appropriate.

. I don't believe it's a good question John.

--1:'-

Sid" 1
I
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O.

Well first of all let me revie~ what I think was on this GIla mind
about the war. First of all he was highly critical of the search
-and destroy strategy, be was critical of the rotation system. He was
critical of the restraint, particulary the one one permitting the North
Vietnamese to use cambodian sanctuaries and he felt that most of those
decisions that supported that came from the politicians and therefore
he tends to blame the politicians for losing the war, that if they had
left it up to the Generals we would have the war. He says the reason
we persisted in these mistakes was that the politicians • the Lyndon
Johnson administration, had no clear political Objectives. And had
made these clear to the public and then had turned to the Generals and
said to them now I want you to fight the war to achieve these objectives
Instead what you had was simply a vague notion that somehow or another
the American security was in danger. They talked about the eventuality
through the domino theory and all. If we lose Vietnam, lose Indo-China
then eventually we're threatened. So, they believed that this was a
serious mistake , that the politicians did not set out the political
objectives clearly to the American people and adapt a military means
to achieve these objectives so that the American people didn't know
why we were fighting this war and it was the basic sauce of why there
was so much dissent about the war. That's what they're saying to me.
These are patriotic guys that are saying to me, and I can't believe it.
we'd do it allover again. Amazing. these are great Kentuckians to
my way of looking at it. I would like you to address that.

A.

Well you're said an awful lot there John.

O.

I sure did, part of it we've gone over haven't we?

A.

On the one on the sanct"u ary I can feel that that is a correct assessment ,
that he felt i t because the threat was there. "In other words if you
knew a division ~as forming ov~r there and you got that word and you
went out to sort of bolster up your defenses. Then you felt that.
And also that platoon being attacked and then running across the border .
then that became obvious to everybody that was there. On the clearcu~
pol~tic~l objective.
With the Military. miesion, I have a little
trouble with that one because in hindsight you could say yes that was
so, and to a degree it was but you \toIere having -- first of all we go
into this thing we don't know \toIhat's going on and if you kne\tol what yo u
know now it would be one thing. Also you have different phases.

O.

Well certain assumptions \toIere made back at that time.
ance for example. of Vietnam to American security.

A.

Well no. that changed too \toIith time.

~

About the import-
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O.

All rim saying i s it

~a9n·t clearcut to anybody in the world including
the politicians because of what was going on. The situation changed

and responses changed.

Decisions were made when situations changed.

It changed because of the nature of the thing and also antoher factor
in the thin~personally I think that the biggest factor there was that
most people didn't unederstand the protracting nature of the war. An
insurgency is not something that is won over night and the insurgent
is not in a hurry to win it overnight, he knows that's impossible.
A.

To continue answering your auestion John,

on tje getting the public

100% behind the war as I said I think the __ _ _

.. _natu re of the

war was the factor more 90 than other things. And having the American
public lO ~ behind you wou ld reauire leadership that I don't know '
would ever be available. Perhaps a better job could have been done.
On the sanctuary. and I discussed that earlier, that was felt by the
GI's because the threat was across the border and they could get the
reports filled up. that were subject to being attacked and they were
concerned with their own well being. That was something they didn't
like. As to the rotation policy. I would think that when a war is
going to be drug out over a long period of time. and I WOUldn't see
any fast solution to it, to have them stay there two years. three
years, I don't know that they would have done better. Morale might
have been such that it might have been worse. On the point of the
politicians versus the Generals. we talked about that a little. I
didn't feel that so much at my level and I wasn't so concerned about
it. I thought things were progressing reasonably well when I was there.
I knew that we were doing a goed job. We were operating as a mi litar y
unit that could be proud of it's military accomplishments. I'll j ust
quickly summarize my feelings of when the war came to an end. I was
at Fort Knox at that particular time and the way it ended was a hurtful.
thing for me. I grieved over it. I grieved for the South Vietnamese
and I did work with some ' of them closely. mostly the military. Colonel
Long being one of them. We tlaked about the conditions in North
Vietnam and the reasons he left North Vietnam. I was aware of the
brutality that the Marxist system brings when they are forcefull y .
through-the barre l of the gun. imposing their will on a society with
the assumption that they know how a society ought to be organized and
if something is going to interfere with that organization then it has
to be destroyed. Brutally destroyed. To the extent that there were
millions of people in RUssia that were killed after the re volution. the
military part of the revolution. I was aware of the fact that there
would be a bloodshed in Vietnam. there would be horrors for the people.
I saw those people fighting those battles and I knew that I'd be going
in a year and he wouldn't be. his people wouldn't be. I remember one
time seeing a soldier that was in one of those fortified positions.
special forces position on outpost and his wife was bringing him
dinner and his gun . with the kids and I thought that's a tough way to
have fo live. to be fighting something and doing it over this prolonged
period of time. And to all of a sudden abandon them . and set them up
through congressional action. we in essence at the end cut off their
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bullets and their spare parts, their gasoline and at the time that ~e did
that the North Vietname se ~ere mobilizing, moving, supply equiping and
making ready for the all out Bssualt for the final victory. They had no
intention of adhering to the cease fire and the agreements that we worked
out in Paris. And of course at the time it ended the assistent secretary
of defense was in Fort Knox and we were touring something, I remember I
was grieving as if I'd lost a friend and I asked him, what is the reaction
in Washington at your level, I said I'm grieving over this thing, I'm
suffering from it and he said we~: we're all doing it. Then of course the
~~____~ people thing came to pass and that was your blood and your
brutality. You know when the communist take over they get very concerned
about the counter revolutioners so they get brutal with those people, they
go through the education program, they break them up from their families.
t hey get a response and then they get out the sword and start chopping
off ears. To me that is a horror story and to me that is not humanistic.
To me the emphasis on the humanistic aspect of getting us out of there
because of the balance that is involved and the civilians on the perferes
of the battles over a long period of time which had taken heavy tolls.
that is a dehumanizing thing but it si nothing compared eith what the
population is subjected to if you don't perclude it . All you have to do
is look at Cambodia and what happens and I was aware of that through
studies, through talks and through talking with people who were on the
perferes (sp) of the systems of the kinds of systems who've been in it.
Getting the information first hand, I wasn't surprised when they went into
Cambodia and slaughtered what a fourth of their population, two million or
something like that.
Q.

Well the cambodians did that to themselves.

A.

The Marxist did it. It's a brutal system. As _ _
_ _ said, he
was one of the scholars that wrote a couple of books. He said one
time that when he was in prison in there--the system itself, his writing
are brutal. It's not something that Lennon did to it or Ball, somebody
else in later times that betrayed his, not his theory, but his doctrine.
his truths which they're not as far as I'm concerned. But what happens
is you'd have this power that is consolidated into the hands of a few
so that they can come to the capitol of cambodia and say, we can't
feed you, everybody out. And when the people res i st off come the
heads, as the heads start coming off more and more resistance, more
and more heads so you can get that b1.oody brutal thing.

Q.

This is what we left them in?

A.

This is what we left them in and that hurt me. I didn't see that as
humanistic. I didn't see that as being right. I sa" us abandoning
them after we assured them that was not going to be the case.

Q.

But it wasn't all our fault ?
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~e

decided to

~a9h

our hands of them

...

A.

Well

Q.

We left them in fairly good shape.

A.

No, the essence of it ~ at the very end when it annted they didn't
have beans and bullets because we cut them off with congressional
legislation in the allocation of funds.

o.

Well that's true but we didn't cut them off with nothing, after all . .

A.

It amounted to as much because it gave the North Vietnamese the military
advantage at a time when we'd pulled out, so that they were able to
bring it off. It was a foregone conclusion. People can say well they
broke and run.

O.

I know but there is also the side that 57,000 Americans lost their
lives trying to defend this country and it didn't work out'. You're
putting every responsibility on this country and it's true but I don1t
believe the South Vietnamese were through when we left them in 1973
or that they really made the right kind of decisions to keep their
country together. But I can appreciate your views and I appreciate
your telling me how you feel about it all. Have you, in educating
the American public as to what was going on, did you see the series
about Vietnam on television?

A.

Yes, most of it. It was pretq, good, but there were some things that
were left out and some important things that were left out and I didn't
know if it wa s deliberate or wasn't deliberate.

Q.

Such as what?

A.

Well one thing that business of cutting off their bullets and beans
at the end, I don't think you 'd discern that if you weren't aware of
it.

Q.

What was the other?

A.

Also the fact that they overplayed the Nationalistic part of the
conflict, which I agree was there, but essentially Ho Chi Minh was a
Marxist and he was one to establish a Marxist regimen. He wasn't
going to be ' any ' national, democratic system and I think that was sort
of inferred . And I think it is strong and I think you can go back in
history and see. It's just like the El Salvadorans when they all got
together in a coalition to fight that rotten regimen that was down
there. And as soon as that other force got there, they with their
discipline and organization threw all those other forces out. all
those other elements out. And those other elements are the ones that
are fighting them now . It's not all the one that the CIA are supporting
because they were betrayed in their revolution. I think the same thing
would have gone on there because it 's their doctrine. it's what they
say they're going to do. it's in their writings .
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o.

Each of the men that I've talked to about the war, I've asked them one
I'd like to ask you that question as a final part of this
before we come back to your experiences ' at Morehead and that is, Why
do you think we lost the war? The politicians lost the war according
to a lot of these guys, now, how do you stand on that? How is your
analysis of it?

A.

Well I think there are three big factors that were significant.
first one was awareness of the nature of the war .

Q.

We didn't recognize this?

A.

Right.

Q.

Who's we?

A.

Our Nation.

question.

The

I think the government and the Media both did a poor job

of saying what's going on over there. The media I fault in two ways
and one is bringing the sensational into the living room that would
make it obscene, that really distracted from what was there. d i stracted
from the inhumane threat that was made to that organization. In fact
John, there was a chaplin in South Vietnam that could visit all the
religious. the Bhuddist, the Protestant, the Catholics and all of those
relig~ous people.
They were saying that to discontinue it wou l d be
immoral. not the war itself, but to discontinue it would be a greater
lie. which would mean if you chose it would be an immoral choice and
I agree with that. I don't think people felt that and there was that
claim by the anti-Vietnamese people that is was immpral. The immprality
of the war and I think the media contributed to that after the battle
they'd go in and find things that were abominitions and bring them
into the living . room. And I don't know if that was deliberate or whe the
it was to get rated number one over the competing station .
O.

Whose going to be the more sensational in order to get the audience .

A.

Right, for _example. there was one time when they showed a GI cutting
off' ears of a group of ~ead North Vietnamese. Another thing they
were little too and · the~e were some people that actually got to
feeling sorry for the little Vietnamese. That was a terrible act. it
was gruesome and it was terrible and it wasn't right and it wasn't the
thing that was normally done. It was an exception but it's not to say
those kind ' of things didn't occur, they did occur and even those kind
of things were occuring in Morehead at that same time, not to that
extent but 1 mean some brutal. nasty, rotten, things. So the image
of Vietnam was that those guys over there are baby killers. That
image was eventually shifted so that the military guy was a baby killer
and the little Viet Cong was a good guy being beat up on by a bu 1 ly.
I think that was felt out there in the public and caused a swelling of
the Anit-Vietnam thing,that coupled with a lot of other things.
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So our heads

~ere

turned from

~hat

the problem

~as

and

~hat

was being done

and there were a lot of good things being done in Vietnam by our forces,
by our doctors, by our Glle, by the military, by the civilian activities
that were going on . There was corruption and that part was played big-here you are fooling with a corrupt regime, why are you helping a corru~t
regime. I would say given the situation, that they handled it well. that
the corruptible nature of man when you pour millions of dollars into a place
there are people who're going to get their hands on it and there's going
to be some corruption. The corrupt elements in our society are going to
~ays

be operating. I remember some of the scene's where they showed some
of the prisoners, where they were being mistreated. Now, if you go into
our prisons you can get scenes where our prisoners were being mistreated,
and some of them were being mistreated . The scene where the Chief Inte'l i ge
officer sho that fellow in the street, it was a famous p i cture . You see,
you didn't understand that,it was a brutal thing and it was murder, you
couldn't condone it under the Geneva conventions of war but if you go into
what happened, this guy had shot one of his immediate kinfolk. ' I don't
know if if was brother, sister, there'd been two or three things that had
just occured and _ _ _ _ _
_ was going on. So you don't understand this
guy's feelings, all you see is a mean son of a gun with a pistol shooting
a guy and it was brutal to see it . Now I don!t get upset about the 57,000
casualties as a lot of people do because that is an attitude. We in our
society say in order to get from point A to point B faster, we'll accept
50,000 death's on the highway and take the car, one year. So that's an
attitude more that it is a fact . And I'm not saying that was a good t h ing
to have ' casualties . that's a sad thing and if you see them and know them
it's a sadder thing. I've seen it , I've seen them bring them ,out in the
poncho and I recall seeing one fellow one time Were they brought him out
to this airport and left him there and he was there all by himself wrapped
up in a poncho, nobody knew h i m and I didn't know who he was but I fe l t it ,
I wondered who is he, what are his mother and father going to think when
they get the word. So, yes that part is ugly and it's hurtful but the
struggle is something t h at you have to decide if it is going to be a s t ruq gl,
or i 'sn' t going 1D be a struggle. I say then that the News Media turned ou r
heads and did not focus on things that were proper. I think they d id a poor
job and to ~orne extent I think that they made a decis i on that t he war was
wrong and planted their news to prove it. To some extent I think fuat wa s
done, you can't say that with absolute certainity but I felt like t hat wa s
there to some extent. I think that the open society and the press is
essential because the fidderence is what you get in the closed societ y.
The other point that I was going ~o make is about why we lost. You
mobilize a big force and you're not in support of it. You were mobiliz inq
a political force that was sayi ng come out and the media was a fac to r i n
that. At the same time they were doing that they were giving the other
side hope. Now, if you're going to be an i nsurgent, one of the things you
need is hope and if you have people like Jane Fonda who went to Vietnam,
I ' ll never forgive her, forgi veness is absolutely essentia l. and I can i t
with everything but her, in t ha t respect. She hurt our prisoners imrnedia tel~
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I mean ~hen she came in there there were some that were tortured because
of her presence, according to their own testimony . And she gave them hope
and was saying good things about them and bad things about us. So what
you're doing see was influencing the public to say this is nasty, you've
got to get out, .it's immoral and you were giving the other side hope. So
that was a bad thing and that was a factor. So the media, tha nature of
the war. I think those were the big factors. Those were the big things.
O.

What about the politicians 'which is the GI . . • Well you've already
addressed yourself to that.

A.

Yes.

O.

No. I said politicians.

A.

Even the politicians had a tough struggle I'd say. It's not an easy
thing to strugg le with right now . In our own back yard I see essentiall'
the same reactions coming and I fear that theylre going to be distracted
and they're not going to follow the Bly Parsons commission report and
say yes it is Russian and Cuban i mpact and there in a significant kind
of context and we ought to prevent it. We'll get side tracked on the
little side issues. on the death sauads and I'm not saying those death
sauads are not a very evil thing, they are, but we'll be distracted
that people will say it's immoral to go in there and then justify the
action. Well to turn to Morehead . . .

O.

Yes. You were the professor of Military Science, head of the Reserve
Officer Tra ining Corp at Morehead from 1969-1973. This was an interesting time in the history of the University because of the react ion of
the student body to the Vietnam War. I'd like for you to ~ell me,
relate to me how you saw the scene at Morehead · in those four years
beginning with, .I think you mentioned the other day the instructions
that your commanders were giving you before you came to Morehead.
Do you want to start at that point?

A.

Well by_19~9 the Anti-Vietnam movement was growing and during that perio,
I was there it blossomed out until the end of the war . Of course Kent
came during that time and that was sort of a high poing in the student
participation in the Anti-Vietnam, Anti-military movements. So throughout our Nation. even in the deep south. even in Morehead. a relatively
conservative univers ity , there was a lot of Anti-~tetnam actions by
various student groups . There was a student mobilization committee at
Morehead. The most militant one was the SOS and we didn't have any of
those at Morehead but we did have the student mobilization committee.

I don't think the Generals did a rotten job.

Tape III
Side 2

O.

Well they were already established, the mobiliza tion committee had
been formed. What did you anticipate as you came to Morehead. What
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did you think
with?

~as

going to be the situation that you would have to deal

A.

I was aware of the fact that there wa s a large segment of the student
population that were Anti-Vietnam.

Q.

One of their targets was

A.

The PMS and ROTC.

I was aware that there was a serious threat to our

whole system through this drive to get ROTC off campus .

o.

Had that begun already?

Elsewhere?

Was ROTC on the campus before

you came?
A.

Ves it'd been there about a year.

Q.

Who was the previous PMS?

A.

Tom Harris

Q.

He was there for just one year?

A.

Yes I think so, thereabouts.

O.

He had established it on campus?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So, one of the things that you ' re concerned about was that the ROTC
would be the target of the student mobilization is that it?

A.

Yes. Not only that but other things too . The danger to our society
was, if they were effective and able to move ROTC off the campus,
then that would exclude the military from getting their future leaders
from the academic world. That would be a serious threat, not that you
couldn't cernmission your people through other systems such as West
Point , but the value with ROTC in our system was that it kept the
military in step with the civilians and it did that through bringing
men and women that were commissioned as second Lieutenant that would
be the future leaders. They would be getting an education from a variet~
of disciplines and this was important because an engineer is generally
more conservative than a guy that's majoring in Social Sciences .

Q.

So you're really trying to protect the ROTC system? And specifica1. ly
in Morehead that was your mission. When you came there now -- of course
the President was Adrian Doran and I would assume almost immediately
this man was a man of conversation with yo~, am I correct?

A.

Yes he was.

I'.. Tell me something about your relationship with Dr. Doran.

·.
•,
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A.

My relations with Dr. Doran were good and his leadership and attitude
about this whole thing made my job much easier and two of the things
he did that allowed us to succeed in having one of the best programs
in the Nation, we were number four in the MS3's, the cadets that chose
to go into an advanced program who had made a decision and commitment
to go into service.

Q.

Well he reviewed this situation with you then as you took command.
What was the nature of the conversation?

A.

Well the jest of it was that fine. ROTC is here. It's necessary, it's
good for our Nation. That was his attitude. Now he accepted this
thing and he also said that there are students and they have the righ6
to pursue their interest and take the offering the same as any ether
student. The student has a right to dissent and express his dissension
as long as he doesn't interfere with you and your guys. I can go and
tell the cadets that see. In the meantime I tell the cadets also that
in this sensitive situation their action is to be such that it will
not create a bigger problem and because of that you may have to endure
some inputs and some suffering you wouldn't normally be expected to
take. It wasn't too long before one of the guys came in and tole me
that one of the hippies, as they call them, spit on him when he was
wearing a uniform.

O.

Was there much of that?

A.

No there was only that one incidence, but there were some things that
were done and I'll go into them in a minute. He accepted that responsibility and I told Dr . Doran that and if he could have found the guy
he'd have expelled him and he told me so. We knew that and the cadets
knew that , so those guys couldn ' t arbitraily perpetuate a wrong. Now
at some universities they did allow it.

Q.

Do you think Doran was trying to drive ·these guys off the campus?

A.

Well, he ' d . have been happy if they had left, the student mobilization
committee.

Q.

Do you think he was deliberatily putting pressure on them?

A.

No. we did not take any definite actions to get them off campus. And
we never discussed it . So that was the basis. I'm in concrete, you
see, he said, 'you're here, you're needed here, what you ' re doing is
right and needed for our society and you have some rights in the
process'. So I passed that on to the cadets and the cadets responded
to it. They also told me you have to be careful, that they try to
disrupt and insult and embarras and even destroy ROTC property. They
had some instances that they knew this was happening out in this new
world and here is the information for you and it's best for you not to
get involved in a debate with them, in a public debate with them
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because part of their goal is to embarras you in that process Bnd maybe
thro~ a tomato at you and hit you in the face.
So, as I took over the job,
a week after I was there I guess, there was a group that came out and put
crosses on the campus.
O.

What king of crosses?

A.

Crosses representing a burial , it looked like a cross you'd find in
a military cemetary. They drove them into the ground right out front.

o.

Oh , they represented death?

A.

Yes . They were long haired and they had the bands, the black band
with a peace symbol on it and I was watching this out of the window
and some of the other students came and took exception to it and were
kicking those things down.

Q.

Where were they putting them?

A.

In that little spot by Button Audimrium and there w~s a Vietnam
Veteran there that didn't use good judgement and he was a person
that I would say normally wouldn't exercise good judegment, he was going
to clear their pile, he was taking it as a personal insult.

o.

Did you have much of that, the Vietnam Veteran is on campus now and
he's oonfronted with this.

A.

Well yes they were upset about it and I talked to them and encoura g ed
them not to kick it down and get hostile because that was not their
purpose.

Q.

Did you meet with them as a

A.

I met with them some, yes. And had them over to my shop auite
frequently and talked to them at some length about it. They were
concerned about it and didn't like it and felt it was contributing
to the possibility of losing the war.

Q.

Did you remember any of those guys?

A.

I don't remember their names right off the top of my head. Of course
on the student mobilization committee I remember their names. Mike
Green was the number one guy. I'll think of another name or two in
a minute.

Q.

How many were there do you know?

A.

About seventy I would say, seventy to a hundred.

Q.

Which would be what percentage of the total population?

A.

Well there was about · 7,OOO plus students. so not much.

The death of the soldiers in Vietnam?

group at all ?
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Q.

About one percent.

A.

No~ there were a lot of people that were sympathetic with them, these
were the radical elements.

Q.

How many do you think were sympathetic?

A.

I'd say probably over twenty-five percent and that's just a wild guess .
Then there were twenty-five percent on the other side that were hardnecked. what they would call rednecks, that would beat them up if they
could. And that was one of the dangeps. One of the things that I
kept saying was if you're not careful in dealing with this thing you
could create an incidence that would bring evi t e·l:ements out on both
sides that would cause a serious evil event, somebody getting killed.

o.

Did you see much conflict between the extreme groups?

A.

I counseled the extreme groupe quite often because . .

o.

Which group?

A.

Well they're organized.

O.

The rednecks you mean?

A.

Yes.

O.

Of course you met wi th the radicals too?

A.

Oh yes. Wel l I'll tell you a little story about that. My feel i ng ,
general l y, was to stay away from them from what I'd been told but after
this cross incidence I decided . . .

O.

When did that take place?

A.

Spring r'd · say, probably of 1970.

O.

So you met with some of them?

A.

I went over and talked to Dr. Doran about it. I said, I think I want
to mingle with them and get to know them. They were going to ha ve a
meeting and they advertized it all over c~pus. And I said I think
I'll go to one of their meetings and he said, I don't know if you
want to do that or not, there ~ some risk in it. I said yes I bel i eve
there is but I don't want them to refer to me as the PM5, I want them
to know me as Colonel Kelly and I believe :lH: would be to my advantage
if they know me as Colonel Kelly. 50 he said, whatever you think .
They were having a meeting in Ginger Hall and it was on the grou nd floo r
They advertized the time and place so I went. I was in my uniform and
as I got there the classroom was full, standing room onl.y . There was

They were sort of the red birch type, the right of right.
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a chair up front and that chair was facing the crowd so I decided lid go
up there. I went up there and sat down and of course all eyes were on
me and I wasn ' t enjoying that and I didn't do it for that reason but I
felt like I had to get in there and become Colonel Kelly and not PMS because
they were meeting to decide what to do at our parade and awards ceremony
what was coming up.

That was the purpose of the meeting.

And I also knew

that they'd done at some of these things, they ' d thrown tomatoes at them
while they were in formation, they'd laid on the ground in front of them
8S they were marching (at different universities). So they were going to
organize and decide what to do . I went in there and set down and faced
them and they went back to business, there ~as sort of a pause. Well,
before they went back to business a dog followed me in and it ~as raining
and he was wet and he ~alked right up to me and shook himself off. he shook
water allover me. I had to take my glasses off and clean them and I just
looked out at the group and I said I bet that dog is a member of the student
mobilization committee and they all laughed and that broke the ice. Then,
I believe Mike Green was the Master of Cermonies. they were using the
Roberts rules of procedure so one of them would get up and make a motion
and then a discussion. lets get some tomatoes and throw tomatos at them and
lets do ..•. . essentially what they had done before. that's all. They
weren't that creative. But my presence being there you kno~, somebody
else would get up and say well that doesn't seef auite right and there'd
be some debate and they'd eliminate it. So they kept eliminating them.
And finally the y got down to where ,ok, we'll go there in mass formation,
we'll be in the stands and we'll have our sig ns. That was what they were
going to do . Then tqey brought up the issue, they're always trying to
get at the quality of the instructions and quality of the cur~iculum .
They were trying to say that that wasn't worthy of a college students
efforts and used that on some campuses to get the administration or t he
academics to declare it not worthy of credit. And if you knocked the
credit out that would reduce your chances of attracting the type peop l e
in there you want. And also they tried to get them to deny the rank of
professor to the head of the ROTC Department . And had done this on s ome
campuses and had even eliminated it on sone campuses, including Harvard.
When you take Harvard out of the thing you're taking a slice of an importan t
academic insti~ution. You're taking that out of the services, you aren't
going to get those people out of there in the army any more. You add t h at
up, then it becomes a serious loss . So we've got to fight this part i cu l ar
thing . They wanted to do a survey on those topics, auantity and auality
of both the instruction and the curriculum. I had done one and I knew the
results and it was good. We were rated above the ______
~titu tio n
I didn't fear it at all on the content of the curriculum or on the ouality
of that instruction. So they were go t ng · t~ do a survey and what they
~ere going to do was take the instruments and just scatter them around
campus, so I held up my hand and got the floor and sa i d, if you want to d o
it. and I recomment that you do ad it , then i suggest that you do it i n
a way that it would be valid so they couldn't challenge you as being in valid . I said I think if you scatter the instrument around a case could
be made against you that it wasn't valid survey ana research effort. Beca u s ·
I said , anybody could come and fill out a form and one guy might fil l ou t
a hundred, that would be what I would say decountered.

And I said, I ' l.l.
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give you an opportunity to do a valid survey, I'll make the classrooms
available to you. Mike Green jumped up and said we're not going to do
that, he said you would bias the students and you ' d control it and I said,
I'll tell you what weIll do. we'll turn the classroom over to you, leave
it and you can give them the survey and you can collect it. We won't have
a hand in it. Then there was a lot of arquement between them and finally
it carried the day and they did the survey and the results were essentially
the same thing we already had and they were favorable for us.
Q.

Where did the survey go around?

A.

It went to the cadets and it was reauired at that ti me.

O.

Dh I see, this is the survey among the cadets to
of the program they were in.

A.

Right, and all the freshman were involved so a hundred percent of the
fr.'ishrnan male were there except the ones that had physical disabilities.

Q.

It was obligatory at that time?

A.

Yes, it was required.

O.

So that actually was your first confrontation with this group?

A.

Yes. So, they are knowing me and I'm knowing them. I know their
names and they know mine. I invite them over and I also to'.d them
I'd help them prepare the survey instrument or if they didn't want
me to do that I suggested they get over to the research center and
get some professionals to prepare the instruments.

O.

But they actually went through with it?

A.

Yes they did , they got it consolidated
results out i n the public.

Q.

It was very favorable?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I would probably see that i n the Trail Blazer at that particular time,
would you think so?

A.

It might be some of those things were there.

Q.

That would be in the Spring of 1 970?

To the whole student body?

see what they thought

_~

.

. and put the
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A.

I believe it was the spring of 1970.

Q.

One of the things I plan to do is go through old issues of the Trail
Balzer and see how they recorded all of this .

A.

I also as I departed invited them to come and see me one on one any
time they wanted to. To talk about anything they wanted to talk
about and particularly Vietnam. I made it a point to invite the number
two g uy, I I 11 think of his name in a minute. he came 1.ater on.

O.

Who. Mike Green?

A.

Well yes Mike and I had several debates . we had one on the Radio. he
invited me to debate him. Of course I had talked to him and I knew
his feelings from the inside, I'd sort of , as the saying goes, been
inside his head. And I knew he was a passivist to the extreme and he
was a militant passiviat but not a violent passivist. He was on the
verge of a Marxist, he used the Marxist language when he talked about
insurgencys and Vietnam and all those things. You know you can't be
a passivist and be a Marxist, that's a contradiction and that was a
problem for him. I saw him later on at the University, 1976, he was
at the University of Kentucky, he worked there and he had moved over
into the hard Marxist idea and he had become violent and he'd moved
away from his passivism.

O.

Do you know anything else about Mike Green, what kind of a background
did he come from ?

A.

He came from a reasonably good family. I knew a lot about him at the
time, I can't remember all the details now. But he had a bad famil y
situation, there were a lot of things there that would create problems
for a young man growing up. And he was involved in drugs, I knew that
and quite a bit. One student who knew him very well told me he was
unpredictable as to what he would do. He would do things that were
dangerous and fool with drugs. But he was pretty bright, he ' d read
Karl Marx and he knew what he had to say, knew h i s i deas and tha t sort
of thing. He knew a good deal about what was going on in Vietnam bu t
most of it was coming from the slanted version , the leftest, the l iberal
extreme, that side. And the language was used, Karl Marx language was
used in a lot of his conversat~n .

Q.

Well trying to keep this chronological you had this meeting and you had
this survey come out. What do you recall next?

A.

Well the radio debate . And in that process the f i rst thing I asked
him was, I said Mike are you a passivist and he said yes .

O.

Were these debated the spring of 1970?

A.

I think that's later on, 1971 maybe or at least in the latter part o f
1970 .
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O.

In the fall maybe?

A.

Yes.

O.

Was he a senior at the time, do you recall?

A.

No he was about a sophomore. His answer was, yes I'm a passivist, I
don't believe in killing. I said can you ever justify killing and he
said never. So I asked him a auestion, I said what would you do if

It

~ould

be even later than that probably.

you were in Texas when that fellow went beserk on top of the building
and killed about seventeen people in one wild terroistic action and
you were a law enforcement officer. I asked him first if he could be
a law enforcement officer and he told me he could, anyway, would you
shoot him? And he said no I couldn't do it that would be immoral , that'
killing.

So I said to him then, Mike that being the case you ought

to be against ROTC and you ought to be trying mget it off campus as
you are. And we talked a little about that. Then the next thing that
occurred was Kent coming up and things were getting tight.

o.

This was the invasion of Cambodia, it had taken place in April of 1971.
and Cambodia came right after that. That effected our campus a lot.

A.

Right, so campuses were going on a rampage all around the United States
and being closed.

O.

Did you talk with Doran this time?

A.

Dh yes.

o.

what do you recall talking to him about, was this after Kent that you
tlaked to him?

A.

Oh I talked with him through the whole thing, constantly.

o.

How , oft~n

A.

Oaily practically, well more or less, not to talk about that one thing
specifically but usually we were in contact daily. And Cooper said that
that was on all of our minds his included.

o.

What was his relationship with this group, did he talk with them a t all,
meet with them?

A.

Yes I believe he did talk with some of them. I was never with him.
He did talk to a whole group one time, there was a group when a parade
was cnming through the street and I think John Kleber was in the
parade and they had the candlelight thing.

O.

But this is ahead of the story isn't it?

do you think you met with him?

You're up to the point of
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April 1971 of the Kent killing after cambodia. Up until that time do
you think Doran had any personal relationship at all of talking with
Green, to your knowledge?
not aware of it personally.

A.

I'm

Q.

You met Green but don't recall the President • . •

A.

Oh. I think he did, I don't know that he called him to his office but
I think he talked to him at various places at different times in
fleeting contacts.

Q.

How about other members of the faculty and administration, first of all,
did any of them get involved with you, did you feel that, of course
Dr. Doran was with you.

A.

Well Kleber and I talked frequently about things.

You know, the issue

of Whether ROTC should be reauired and the National Security course.
that all came out of this thing and John was involved actively in that.
Q.

How was that? Tell me that story about you and Kleber. Do you think
you were on the opposite side of the fence about this issue?

A.

No, by the t~ I got to Kleber we were pretty much on the same side
of the fence. He was a little concerned about ROTC and the military
being on campus.

Q.

He was opposed to it?

A.

Well, he was opposed to the reauired aspects of it and I think he was
probably opposed to the war.

Q.

Did he talk with Green?

A.

Yes he knew him.

o.

Did he attend the meetings, was he one of the more activist?

A.

No, he didn't attend the meetings, no he wasn't in those meetings t hat
I'm aware of. I don't believe he was. And he wasn't one of their
advisors, not the student mobilization committee.

O.

Well, how did he get involved in this issue then with you? Did he
represent a different viewpoint of the presence of the ROTC on
campus than you did ? He was opposed to it?

A.

Well I don't believe he was totally opposed to having ROTC on campus ,
he was opposed to having it required.

Q.

I

A.

And he wasn't comfortable with Vietnam at that particular time and

see~

I think he talked to him.

That part in which he was trying

,

"

.
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I think he became more amfortable with it in his relationship

what I did too.

~ith

me and

I amde it a point to talk with most of the faculty on the

subject of ROTC and it's importance and trying to keep it viable and
going. So I had inputs from many of them and I had some of them that were
a lot of help to me.

o.

I just want to pursue your relationship with Kleber. I want to talk
with him about this too.

A.

He and I had some talks and I don't remember how it first came about
we got involved. I was trying to address solving a problem that was
a problem to the administration for the Army and for the student.
I did a lot of soul searching as to how you would do it and one of the
problems in this business of trying to weaken the ROTC, it is an antimilitary thing and a passivist thing was mixed in with it and a Marxist
thing was mixed in there with it too.

Q.

Now was this a cooperative relationship with John?

A.

Yes.

Q.

In what sense were you cooperating?

A.

Well the problem was ROTC was being weakened on the campuses and the
University of Michigan had 40,000 students and forty cadets.

John and I were cooperating all the time.

Tape IV

Side 1
Q.

Well he was associated with many of the students perhaps m9re than
any of the other professors did and he was probably in a position
talking with them a lot more and was this something that gave you
the entpee to him to get some understanding of what was going on,
is that it?

A.

Yes.. He was a source of information on what I s going on with the
students and it was necessary for me to know their feelings and understand their positions and I feel like I got to do that pretty well and
he was a valuable source.

Q.

And you understood him as being opposed, not to the presence of ROTC
on campus but the fact that freshman were required ~take this course
the ir first year?

A.

And wear the uniform.

Q.

He was opPos,ed to that? So in that sense he and Mike Green saw eye
to eye and you were not in the same camp on that obi vi ously that IS
where your conflict came in?

A.

I wouldn't say it was conflict because like I say I have to study that
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question and I was getting ready to tell you that there were three problem~
as I just mentioned and how do you address them. The student didn't like
to wear a uniform and I understood that because the attitude was very antimilitary and thaa was in a large segment of the student population and I
understood their feeling. So to wear the uniform was a humbling experience.
My attitude was keep them out of uniforms as much as you could. Now the
department of defense had decided, now they'd give on a lot of things and
they were being pushed and pushed, they gave up on the issue of getting
credit for ROTC.

o.

That eventually takes place in Morehead doesn't it?

A.

No not credit.

And they gave up on one place where they reauired them

not to give the professorship rank. So they keep _
_
until
you're playing into the hands of the guys that are trying to get it
killed militarily or at least get it off c.mpus. So weaken the military
The idea, because of anti-Vietnam feelings to kill a military is a very
dumb thing to do and some people were caught up in that that were not
necessarily passivist in nature. So the auestion then Ehow do you
get them out of the uniform . The department of defense said we ~il1
go no further., they will wear the uniform and there ~ill be ~eapons
on campus or there ~ill be no ROTC program on your campus. And some
of the institutions said take it, about five of them. Harvard being
one of them. That was a big loss. Also about this time the lottery
s y stem was coming in and so the young freshman was c~ming in and h e had
the opportunity to go into ROTC and delay his entry into the mil i tary
and go in active duty as an officer. If y ou have a col l ege educatio n
and you get your military education as you go then you're in a good
posit ion to offer more to t h e mil i tary . You've got junior leaders
coming out of college. It was to their disadvantag e to get a l ow
lottery number and get dragted and 'go out and be taken out of co l lege
and go in as a private. That was a problem for the student, a prob lem
, for the Army was the uniform and a problem for me and the univers ity
was attracting them into the program so the probram would be viab le .
Then it da~ned on me, why not have a course offer i ng that would b e of
the nat~e that you could give Military Science credit for it, it
wouldn't be ROTC, and have it for half a semester and have it so t ha t
they could go from that into ROTC and get military credit for i t a nd
go right on.
O.

Would this be in place of the freshman program?

A.

Yes . Initially see, you're not taking ROTC, you go in there and you
don't have to come wi t h a uniform on. Now at first I wanted them to

o.

They still have that don't they?

A.

Well they did away with it just recently because of finicial co nstra ints
They shouldn't done it anyway, it was a mistake . But a l so with t hat
idea ~as to address some of the problems that needed to be addressed
to the people of that age. And one it do you need a military , why d o

....
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need a military, what's the economics of it, what's the moral issues of
'War and peace.

o.

You're talking with John, I'm assuming at this point.
with him about these things too, right?

A.

Not yet, I haven't brought him into it yet. So finally, I get a documen1
together that comes up and the idea is to bring in . people that have
experience in these areas. Bring ih a philospher on the moral issue
of war and peace. Get them from other campuses. And bring in the
different military to talk on the different military aspects of it.
And bring in academic specialist in Marxism and the unsurgent threat.
There's a professor at New York that's one of the most noted.

Q.

What was the name dthat program you finally established?

A.

National Security.

Q.

Do you recall when it was?

A.

No I don't. I can get those dates for you. Anyway I sat down and
talked with him and tried to concince him that we ought to try and do
it. He agreed to do it. We were going to have them in Uniform at the
time because it was still a reauirement of the Department of defense .
I suggested he form a committee and study, I think a committee was being
formed at that time to study whether or not these issues remained
required. And maybe John Kleber, that was Dr. Doran / s initiative and
other administrators initiative.

Q.

Kleber was on that anmittee?

A.

Yes he was. There was a cadet and a student that was anti-military at
the time and later went into the military. He got a commission and
was glad that he was a part of it because he got to be drafted and
finally got a commission. Not through ROTC though, it was another, the
Navy pr~gram. And, I invited them all to go to Fort Knox and took them
to Fort Knox with me and showed them the lifestyle of an officer and
the military installation and it was a good thing for them .

Q.

So as a result of the committee

A.

Then I recommended to Dr. Doran that John be made the Cahirman.

Q.

Of that committee?

A.

Yes. He at first aaid no, then he said o.k. and did. So the essence
of it,. they went in and met and dicided it was a good thing and
decided to. do away with ROTC as reauired and also to initiate the
National Security.

Q.

So when was that

You're talking

So then I went to Dr. Doran with the paper one day.

Do you r emember who else?

first offered?

this decision was born?
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A.

It was 1972 I believe.

O.

Now before that time there was an incident in which John Kleber participated in a protest parade against ROTC wasn't there?

A.

I think

o.

Do you recall the particul~r9 of that?

A.

No, I don't and I never did talk to him about it.

O.

I was wondering did that take place before or after he was appointed
chairman of the committee?

A.

Before.

Q.

It d i dn't seem to have discredited him with the administration?

A.

No. they wondered about it. they were concerend.

O.

What did they say, what did Doran say about it.

A.

Well they didn't want this thing to spread to the faculty and ha ve a
lot of protest and oppoisition.

O.

Was he the only member of the faculty that . • •

A.

NO, there was one guy in there ~ith him. he
Student Mobilization Committee.

Q.

Who was that? Was he a history department insturctor?

A.

Fall of 1972 was when

~was

started.

80.

~as

the advisor of t he

No, he was in psychology, I don1t remember his name, a little short
hl~w.

Q.

Kind of- curley haired?

A.

No kind of bald. Well let me tell you one more thing about Dr. Doran.
When + initiated tpat thing I knew that it made both people mad . Th e
administration and the Army. But I felt like it ~as going to go b e cause it was advantageous to the Army. the UniveDsity, and the cadet.

Q.

Why

A.

Well it'd make the Army mad because we're going to say you can't wear
uniforms.

Q.

Oh, you don1t have to wear a uniform to take this course?

A.

Right.

~ould

it make the Army mad?

In other words it was an order from the Department of Defense .

....
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it was not just Army, 80 Navy. Airforce and Army required you to wear a

uniform.

o.

Did you have to get this cleared with them at all?

A.

Well that's what I'm going to tell you. Dr. Doran as far as I'm
concerned was a good leader and had a great mind as far as seeing the
essence of things and then being persuasive in getting taken care of
so when I ran it up to the Army channels they come back with me and
they are mad and my immediate boss would have killed it but I had it
in such language that he couldn't dare kill it by himself. he had to
take it to his boss, General
Colonel White was my
boss, First Army.

So General-

--=: .-:..= ~-=- was

.

the head of the

ROTC programs throughout First Army area, a fifteen state area.
Q.

He looked at it then?

A.

Yes, he looked at it and he thought it had so~merit and
bought the idea but at one time in the process of debate
he got up and walked out of a meeting, he got mad at ~
presented the Army side of the thing and some of them he
with and one of them is that uniform thing.

Q.

He wanted to continue the Uniform is that what you're saying ?

A.

No, he wanted to take it off, get it off. no uniform.

Q.

Doran wanted the thing off, well
uni form off?

A.

Well I did but I couldn't.

O.

You weren't publicaly

A.

Yes.

O.

Well give me a little more detail on this walkout incident that took
place, what was the background, what occured there? This was the fight
over whether or not this program of yours was going to go through?

A.

Yes.

Q.

They both got miffed at you?

A.

Yes. I figured he would, see I wasn't suprised. it was one of the few .
Dr. Doran and I got along well. and he never said another word about
it afterword he just got up and walked out.

O.

Well why did he get angry and walk out as you understand it, or Hornback
for that matter?

A.

Well, it was a sensitive issue and there were some disagreements.

I

Dr. Doran
he got so mad
Because I
disagreed

thought you wanted to take the

advocating that?

Ray Hornback was in it, he was there.

Ray got up and left too.

51
O.

What were the disagreements?

A.

I don't remember specific ones, essenti"ally over the uniforms, I don't
remember what was said.

Q.

He wanbed bo keep the uniform?

A.

And he wanted to make a few other little
changes in the curriculum, I CI!I'l 't recall them. Not much, but
eseentially he bought the curriculum because I showed that to him
before I went over there.

O.

Where was this meeting held?

A.

Different places, different times. We had more than one meeting, but
this specific meeting seems to me it was held in one of the rooms in
the presidents, not his office.

O.

Who else was there?

A.

Well John Glen was there and I believe the dean of students was there .

O.

Who was that?

A.

Wilson, maybe Buford Crager.

O.

Was any faculty there?

A.

Yes, there was a faculty member there, it ma¥. have been the Philospher,
what's his name.

Q.

Frank Mangram?

A.

Frank, I'm not sure, I've got a list of who was present in my files.
So anyway the Army was mad at me and the .~re9ident was mad at me. but
there was _movement see. At the next meeting everything went well.
they bought it and decided on no uniforms. I told Dr. Doran you're
going to have to bring my boss down here and sell him on the idea I
don't ha.ve any authority and he said get_ _ _
down here.
So I called him and said can you get down here and gave him the background information and he came down. Dr. Doran sat dwon with him knee
to knee, kind of leaned over and I'm telling you he'd talked !him out
of that uniform before General
_____ __ ___ - knew what was going on.
Now General
__ __was smart and he told me many times he was impressed with him. He'd got his masters, I believe he was a West Pointer
I'm pretty sure he was. What he said when he left there was we'll do
it without the uniforms and I won't say anything to anybody if you won 't

Q.

About what, the agreement?

A.

Yes, about the uniforms.

To take the uniform off.

...
'
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Q.

So it was really under the table?

A.

Well he had orders not to do it. I mean the defense said no further
that's as f~r as we go we're drawing the line. You can understand
that, somewhere you have to draw a line or they'll water it down to
where it's nothing, which is one of their goals.

O.

but he didn't want this generally known?

A.

Well actually after it was over it went Army wlde and there was a l.ot
of publicity. it went in the army times, it was very successful.

o.

Do you have copies of that by any chance?

A.

Yes, I've got results of it. I've got a survey of all the students that
participated in int and a lot of them went into ROTC. In fact, 90 many
of them went into ROTC that in some cases , that came out of National
Security, there was more than some people had in their whole program.
So PM's wrote me from allover. Sent me that program. tell me about
it. we're going to try to do something similiar. People knew about it.
I had officer friends that found out about it in Europe, they said we
know what's go~ng on over there in Morehead. things are moving along
pretty well.
0 National Security went in and this was actually after
Kent. As Kent evolves, this time tensioR is already very high and I'm
getting reports -- I go to PMS meetings at the Army level, all of them
would get together and some of the things they'd bring in there are
horror stories. For example in New York one of the PMS was up there-there was a group of longhaired people that were trailing his wife
and child all the time, wherever she went. If she got in her car they'd
follow her, if she went to the drugstore they went in the drugstore.
He went to the FBI and the FBI said you better get her out of here, you
better send her home, we can't gurantee you we can protect her. So he
sent her home. There was another example where a PMS was sent and of
course I talked to a PMS that was at Kent, they were saying that there
were one o~ two students of SOS that had a bomb and were coming to bomb
the'ir ROTC building in the day time when people were in there, but the
bomb went off before they got there.

Q.

They actuall y planted the bomb?

A.

No they didn't get it in there, , it went off before they got there.

Q.

But they knew that this was going to take place?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was he positive about this?

Well they didn't know it but they fourdout about it .
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A.

He said it like it ~as an absolute fact. I don't know whether it was
or not, it was second hand to me. Then of course, at the University

of Michigan I believe they set fires in the trash cans, at another
University ~hey went in and pulled all the drawars out and emptied the
things in the floor and threw the furniture around and broke it.
There was just a lot of things

like that that were done after Kent.

And of course they burned some of the buildings down and closed some
of the Universities. So I was tense at the time, the Cadets were tense
and of course the studnet body was tense, the faculty was tense. The
tension was there. They burned down a U.K. building so it wasn't
something you couldn't be concerned about, they called up National Guard
for U .. K. One of my faculty members reported to me that a student had
told him that there was a group planning to assa.sin.te . a~e . of the
ROT
·facUlty members and a cadet told me that.

Q.

Did you take that seriously?

A.

Yes,:L took it seriously . But I decided and maybe not rightly so, t ·h at,
well the first thing that wnet through my mind, I ~as already tired
because of all the efforts to try and keep the lid on.

Q.

Did they have a particular target?

A.

No, they were just going to assassinate.

Q.

Was there · anybody that knew this report that could identify the peop'.e?
Was this the Mike Green crowd?

A.

I don't know who it was, it was just reported to me that someone was
planning to assassinate a member of ROTC. And I decided that there
wouldn't be anyghing anybody could do. Two different sources reported
this to me.

Q.

Was this after Kent?

A.

Yes . And I decided there wouldn't be anything the faculty could do.
the police could do. or I could do. And I didn't want to create anymore
turmoil within my own faculty. I thought wouldn't this be a terrible
way to die, to get shot on campus after being to Vietnam.

O.

This
talk

~uld
~ith

This would be the reaction on our campus?

be one of the officers being assassinated,
them at all about it?

but you didn't

A.

No I didn't tell them.

Q.

Did you tell anybody?

A.

No and I told this student , don't say a word to a soul, it's a rumor,
leave it at a rumor.

Q.

Old it leave?

·.
~
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A.

Yes, it dried up and I never heard another ~ord from it.
told this other person, don't say a w~rd to anybody.

And I had

O.

So it's possible that it's no more than a remark of some guy that was
out of his mind at the time and had no intention of doing this. but
it could have been the kind of thing that circulated around could
have created higher tension and temperatures of tempers and all the rest
of it. Is that what you're saying? And you thought the best thing was
to not encourage this and keep auiet and hopefully, 8S it did, it'd
die out.

A.

I didn't tell Dr. beran. Ordinarily I'd tell him everything, I trusted
him and I shared things with him and he shared things with me but I didn
tell him because I didn't want to put that burden on him I didn't want
him to be concerned, I thought that would be too much because things
were very tense. I did tell him 6t that time, I said I've never felt
more tense than I do now, even in ietnam when they told you that they
were going to attack your position, in one particualr case where we
were really isolated, he said,well the difference is in Vietnam you'a
done everything you could do. you'd put out the perimeter and you had
things taken care of and here you don't know what to do, it's 90
vague it's hard to deal with and that's true.

O.

But you were kind of anticipating something was going to happen.

A.

Oh yes.

O.

Mostly on what kind of evidence?

A.

Well evidence was just kind of popping around.

O.

Just on the rest of the country was as you described it and you knew
there was an activist group on campus and you thought well the first
thing you know they're going to try something. Is that what you were
anticipating?

A.

Yes.

Q.

That's logical and you're uptight about it?

A.

Yes and I sent in for the number two man, I can't think of his name and
anyway he came over. I figured he would.

Q.

Who. among their group?

A.

Among the student mobilization committee. Anyway I sent for him thinMing he would corne over. And you know that student mobilization
committee used to make a big thing of it, they wer anarchist. They'd
make a big thing out of a chain command or leadership or order. But
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I knew that there was a chain of command and I knew who was number one and
I knew who was number two. I knew that much about them, I knew a whole lot
about their families and I'd gotten the information through different source

o.

Oh you had a profile on them?

A.

I didn't have files but
tick.

O.

This was not written down?

A.

No.

O.

You inquired about them?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Where were the sources of information?

A.

Well from people that knew them in their home town and people that
knew their families.

O.

What did you do call them up or what?

A.

Well didderent ways, I'd ask different people and ask some people to
get some information for me. lid say what's his background. where's
he coming from. what is it that ' s causing these problems?

Q.

How many of these guys did you try to understand?

A.

Well I tried to understand all of them. I talked to a lot of them.
I mean I didn't get information on any of them but Green and this
other fellow.

O.

They were the two that you concentrated on?

A.

Yes. I really wanted to get inside their head and know where they were
coming from. And I did pretty much.

o.

Did you think pretty much that they were in control of the whole group
and whatever they mid -- that they were strong leaders?

A.

They were leaders.

Q.

And this other guy?

A.

Hansel Lewis. So anyway I sent for Hansel and he came over and this
was right after K~nt. He came over and we started talking and in the
course of the conversation he said tome, I asked him, I said Hansel if
you were in a posLtion to destroy all the military goods, if it was all

I

made it a point to find out what made them

How did you get this information?

Mike Green was one of the leaders.

stacked up in a field, and gasoline was poured on it and all you had
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to do was strike a mata h and burn it up, and you'd get rid of all the
United States of Americas military eauipment in one strike would you do
it? He said, no I wouldn't do that. And I said why not? He said well
you need some. And I said well Hansel the only difference between you and
me is that you know how much we need and I don't, I don't know exactly how
much military power is enough.
Q.

What was the purpose of that auestion, what were you trying to say
to him?

A.

Well I was just trying to see to what degree he was a passiVist. I
mean are you going to defend anything at all. So then I say to him,
if you could get rid of ROTC would you get rid of it and be said yes.
It was the elements. If you could get rid of the elements to the ri ght
side of the spectrum. the rednecks would get rid of them and he said
yes, it's like a cancer, if you had a cancer on your knee what would
you do ? ~nd i said I'd get rid of it, he said that's the 8nBWer you see.
I said do you mean that? 'He said, yes I mean it. I said well let me
ask you this. I said if so~other group on campus decides that all
people, and I described what he looked like, that have a beard, long
hair, jeans, sandals without socks ~ere evil and should be gotten rid
of, what would you think about that? And it dawned on him that that
was too much anarchy. There was another kid that was with him that
wasn't anite as hostile as he was and be said to bern, yeab Hansel
answer #that one, let me hear you answer that one. He couldn't answer
it. eO then he says to me, I'll tell you what we're forming up on the
outside of ~utton Auditorium right now and I'd like for you to come out
and talk to them. Well that was contrary to what I'd been advised to
do but they're ·there, and I've got to make a decsison. So I said to
him, Hansel, I'll t ell you what, if you'll go out there and talk to
that group and if they w~ll invite me as a group to speak to them I'll
speak to them. Well the danger of it is if you open your jouth on
Vietnam and it hits a headline and you say something that's contrary
to the policy in your discipline in the military, you've done dama ge .

Q.

To what?""

A.

To the policy, to the planners. You've just agitated and reinforced
the Anti-Vietnam thing and that would be a problem. So we had to be
very careful about what we said and to speak for anyone, to speak for
the military you've got to be cleared. I can't just get up for the
military and speak for the military policy of Vietnam or speak for the
Department of defense. He goes out there and comes back and says they
want t o talk to you, he said we've got a PA set up out there.

Q.

Where was this, right on the steps?
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A.

Right on the steps of Button Auditorium.

SO

8S

I go out there I

think O.K. I'm not going to speak for the President of the United
States or the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of State or
General

~est

Morlen.

I'll speak as a person who's had experience and

I'll be Colonel Kelly of Morehead State University.

Q.

There were a hundred people there?

A.

More than that I'd expect and as time went on there was auite a few
more than that. The started filtering in. So the hostiles were sitting
right off the the immediate left and I recognized most of them. Mike
Green included. When I take the microphone I tell them I'm not speaking
for anybody, I'll give you my experience and I'll tell you · ~at I
know and what I saw and what I felt. And I'll answer your questions.
I told them who I was, where I was from. about my family. about my
cnildren becasue I wanted them to see me as a human being. not one of
those terrible baby killers. then I said I'll taRe your questions.
The bad guys were raising their hands and Mike was about to have a
fit to get the first question in. So I went right straight to him.
zap. I figured if they insulted me which I figured they would. that
that crowd would move to my side, and I wasn't going to take it personal '
I wasn't going to fire back at him or I wasn't going to insult him. so
the first thing he says to me, he says are you a Christain? That was
his question. And I said well I preport to be. I want to be and I think
you should be , or ~omething like that. Then he has a follow up auestion ,
he's setting me up for thi kill, he says how can you be a C~ristain
and be a soldier? So I said to him I don't have any trouble at all.
I've never lost a minutes sleep over it. I said there has been a
military force throughout recorded histroy, there must be a need for
it and it has been debated on a moral ground by all the major religions
and with exception of a very few and in the minority. at least small
inatitu~ioRs, they've all said there can be just wars.
So then he
says to me, how about tha+ mistreatment of the prisoners in Vietnam and
he told me about an incident, he told the crowd, he's trying to paint
his picture of how nasty it is over there and how nasty the military
is. ~o he said how about the time that they took this guy, this 1.ittle
Viet ong, cpatured him, ' tried to get him to talk, put an electric shock
to him and he wouldn't talk, put him in a well. hanging over the edge of
the well by his fingers. he wouldn't talk, beat on his knuckles. he
wouldn't talk, until he dropped in the well. he wouldn't talk. and they
shot him. I said I don't know but I can tell you this. it might of
happened. but I'll tell you this, in the unit I was with, I was a fire
support cooridnator with a Brigade and whenever there was a major act io n
I was usually there and if a person was captured I was around there. I
said as a matter of fact the tactical operations center had a litt l e
prison compound where they brought the prisoners snd interrogated them.

..
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I said I have even talked to them and one of the things I noticed was
first of all we wanted them and we wanted them alive and secondly we were

suprised at the number of them that would surrender and we were suprised
at what they'd tell us after they surrendered and I was never aware of it
being a problem of getting information from them. I was only aware of one
incident where they captured one of them and there was a hostile reaction
where the Seargent Major offered the guy a drink out of his canteen and
he took the canteen and hit the Seargant Major with it and said I don't
want any of your captilistic water. That's the only incident I know of and
I sa i d as a matter of fact in one incident a pr i soner came in and told us
where his forces were and got in a helicopter and 9ho~ed us ~here they ~ere
and ~atched us assault that unit. I said I was sort of dumb founded by
it to think that he'd do it and I ~ent do~n and talked to the G-2 who ~8e
responsible for intelligence in our division and said ~hy did this guy do
that ? And his answer was well they're told if you're captured y011 , t'e going
to be persecuted and tortured and you're net to be captured and furthprmore
they have people assig ned to them to see that they don't lea v e and even i f
they do they take the responsibility, 80 to me I'm not a~are of any of those
problems. And besides that I say ~ho'8 over there, who's over there, they
are people just like from this group right here. I said essentially most
of them have ~arm feelings to~ard the Vietnamese and don't ~ant ot see them
hurt. And then I told him abo ut one of our little doctors ~ho ~as a
Battallion Surgeon, he ~as a small man, he used to go out to the v illages·
to treat those people and one time he took me to one of the villages and
sho~ed me a young kid about ten years old, good looking little guy, ~ho'd
been born with his hands stuck together and he'd m8de arrangement s to g e t
him evacuted to one of our hospitals and they operated on him and he had
use of the hand. I sa i d ~e were o ut in the jungles and that mother brough t
me a coca-cola, I know it must have been a precious thing for her and she
must have felt like I had something to do with it which I didn't, t he d o cto r
is the one that did it~ b ut she g ave i.t to me and I waen't going to be
rude and turn it down. But he'd gone in some of those vi1lages where there
were cholera epidemics , at risks of stepping on a mine, of being sniped
and 90 yes there were some instances ~here there were some evil things do ne
but essentially , and ~e kept going on from there.
O.

Did no one else hav e quest i ons?

A.

Well there were other auestions but it simmered down .
on for about an hour .

o.

You t:a:lked ,an hour?

A.

Yes, I~d say so. And f i nally you could see the group move towards me
and afterwards some of them carne up and apo l igized to me for the i nsul ts
they were throwing at me. I didn't consider them insults. I d i dn't
take it as something personal so i t didn't hurt me. When that broke
up it sort of calmed things down around there. Then I went home shortly
after that, my dad ~as about eighty-two or three years old.

I guess

~t

went
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O.

I remember him, was he there?

A.

No. But he was a great man, had a lot of wisdom. He was a great
infamous person, you know there are famous people that are not great
and there are famous great people but he was not famous but he was 8
great person. Anyway he offered me a beer . . .

o.

Oh he was there, he was at home?

A.

Yes. Anyway I was exhausted. The _ _ _ _ _ had occured and I had
faced these guys. They'd burnt the University of Kentucky.
80 as

he was pouring that beer for me he looks over to me and he says you know
Author there's evil in the world but essentially it's good. And I
alm~

dropped the beer because I'd been deal ing with the other elements.

And there's one of the antradictions in that student mobilization
committee. They were ~e ones saying that they trusted humantity and
mankind and they didn't, they did not. That was one of their crosses,
they couldn't trust them. So that was the reason why they would except
anarchy, anythings better than what we've got. So I went baCK and had
a leadership labratory and the whole corp was there. I called them
together and told them that stay and they really did appreciate it
because they were going through this too. And feeling this pressure.
It was a tough time.

o.

So he said that there's a lot of evil in the world but that essentially
it's a good place. Was he responding to your situation?

A.

No, he did not, just out of the clear he brought it up.

O.

He didn't even know?

A.

No, he didn't know I'd been through this stuff.
Vietnam thing be caused he watched the news.

O.

It seemed to hit your mood didn't it?

A.

Yes and then it wasn't significant in itself, the statement hut when
you think of who it came from, here he is, he's about eighty percent
deaf and he's got cancer on his face and has had these spots taken off
his face and they bother him, and he's operating on one lung, so when
you get a person that's in that mndition and can see the beauty in the
world in those times that's a pretty big thing, it takes a pretty big
person to do that . That's the thing that impressed me.

Q.

So you had this meeting theft with the corp and you went over this with
them.

A.

It jolted them.

Q.

Is

He was aware of the

One of them came around and told me.

it this time that Doran spoke to the group?

•
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A.

I think that was a little later. It was about the eame time though
during the Kent thing and it was one thing after another . Now he
wasn't on campus at the time, I don't believe. It was late in the
afternoon when it occurred. So there weren't many faculty people there.
There were aome around.

O.

Were there Borne at the talk?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you remember who was there?

A.

Yes.

o.

_ . - - - - - --

A.

Yes.

Q.

Who else do you remember?

A.

Russell

What was his name there, the Iranian, ' or Saudia Arabian.

.__

not sure.

- -'

the man who coaches Boccer, he was there?

___ _ _ . _ _ was there. Dean Davis I think was there. 11m

It's hard when there's a crowd out there.

a.

Doran's not around?

A.

No .

Q.

Was it over this same tension that Doran talked to them?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Were you there at his talk?

A.

No. I wasn't, that was a seperate time . I believe he had them prayi ng
you know before it was over he lead them in prayer. I give Dr. Doran
a lot of credit. As far as I was concerned, and I know some people
felt that he was a little too domineering maybe or dictatorial. He
used to say that hetd like to think of himse l f as being __
But I was in a lot of hot spots with him.

O.

Could you think of any other, was there anything after that?

Was that

the high point?

A.

Yes that was the high point. There was a lot of ta lk going on a l.ot
of meetings and there were some other incidences. But I saw him as
exercising good judgement , good leadership and one of the better leaders
that I've run into and I've run into some great leaders. Some of the
very best , General Johnson was a tremendous leader. I always thought
at the committees Dr. Doran was able to get the ideas out of that
committee group, if there was any i n there he ' d get them and he wou ld
latch onto them and he would use them . I was, prou;d of him and the PMS S
were proud of him. there weren't very many l~ke h~m .
I
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Q.

Did they meet him?

A.

Oh yes I took him around to 8S many places as I could. Not all of
them but some of them. He came to BUImner camp at _ . _ . __
_ Gap
and of course the PMS's, ~e interchanged i nformation because we're

looking for solutions and we were all faced with--it was a very
challenging thing, there was a lot at stake and there was danger. No t
physical danger ncessarily, but danger of serious harm done to the
ROTC program. sO at noon time I said do you want to go over to the
Officers Club and go first class or do you want at go over and have
a peanutbutter sandwhich in the BLQ and meet a lot of the PMS's. He
said I believe I'll go to the BLa and meet the PMS's. We went over
there and they all gathered around him and he shared things with them,
it was reas9urin to them, they needed to be reassured because in some
cases, some of the leadership you kno~ was extremely liberal and very
Anti - Military and those guys, that was kind of a gloom situation for
them. aO having that power, that force, that leadership behind me, eve n
though it was a burden to carry at that time an~ a challeng~ and a lot
of responsibility, it made it so much easier .
0 they knew him throughout the system.
_ _ _ _ ~ =>
and that was with General We st
Morlen. have you heard about that?

___

O.

I might have heard it but I'd like to hear it ag ain >.

A.

Well just as I took o ver the PM5 General lNest Morlen was schedul ed t o
come and be the commencement speaker , so t h at was June of 1970.

o.

Did Doran Inv ite him?

A.

Yes. These incidences were occurring where they were pouring paing
on these military speakers that appeared on campus. A senior officer
went someplace and there was a serious inci dent. made the headl i nes
Nationally .

Q.

Wlsewhere?

A.

Yes. 50 Dr. Doran didn't want that to occur at the university and he
Wondered about the wisdom of bringing him there at that particular
time. I was of the conclusion that is was best not to bring him there
that it would have been cont rary to wha t some PMS's would have sa id,
at least I think it surprised h i m that I felt that was too, supported
h i s decision. agreed with it, concurred with it.

O.

You thought it would be a

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was it already publicized?

A.

Oh yes. and arranged and the General was scheduled to come.

probal i cat ion?

But to change it wo uld be a delicate th i ng.

You' ve go t

the President of the institution and you've got the General that was
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Chief of Staff

and you're going to back down and one eide of the coin

goes why are you backing down are you going to let a bunch of hippies
back you off, you know why don't you be yourself, who's in control and all
those such of things and I'm the middle man, I've got to talk to Dr. Doran

and General West Morlen.
Q.

So you're the middle and Dr. Doran had already made up his mind that
you • • • ?

A.

Yes, I had to go notify General West Morlen that under the circumstances
Dr. doran's concerned that maybe it's not a wise idea to move forward.

Q.

He wants you to go see him personally?

A.

No, I just notify with General West Morlen that this is coming and
Dr. Dorana going to call and talk to him.

Q.

What did you sa y to West Morlen?

A.

Well I just said that ' s the feeling and he's going to call and talk
to you. And Dr. Doran calls and talked to him and General West Mor len
said I'm not going to back down and Dr . Doran said I'm not going t o
ask you to back down and I'm not going to say anymore. General West
Morlen said, I'm not going to say anymore, a little face saving
exercise there. They got somebody else, Frank Mangrum spoke in his
pllllce.

o.

I thought they were leaving it at an impass.

A.

Well it was understood that he wasn't going to come see.

Q.

He wouldn't say that he wasn't going to come though?

A.

Anyway later on in the Pentagon I stopped General West Marlen and
introduced him to Dr. Doran. When General
was killed
i n ,t hat- airplane crash I took Dr. Doran to th; fun;;al, 'am I took h i m
to the Pentagon. General West Morlen was there, he was walking down
the hall and I said General West Marlen, Sir. He stopped and I said
I want you to meet a distinguished educator, Dr. Adron Doran. He
said, Dr. Doran, and they chit chatted back and forth for awhi l e.

O.

They didn't talk about the incident?

A.

They kind of laughed about it I believe. I don ' t remember exactly
what they said. I'll te ll you one thing, in the National Security
course I brought General Johnson down, the Chief of Staff. He's a
very eloauent man . And to get him to come I told him, I'll make it
an exciting day for you, I can't pay you. I told him, I'll, 1.et you
speak to a group of the hostiles, I'll let you speak to a group of
the educatiors and I'll let you speak to anyone on the academic
community that comes to the lecture.
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O.

What was his full name?

A.

Harold K. Johnson. sa he came down and we had him with little
Cadet groups, we worked him all day.

O.

I

A.

In the senate room.

O.

Yes.

A.

Anyway, when he left he wrote me a letter afterwards and he said that
he thought the National Security course was a great thing. He said
it was a very exciting day for him, this was he was leaving, he said
we made a mistake and he said we decided after this incidence we were
going to minimize the exposure on the campuses. And he said we should
have been having the exchange, we should have faced the hostiles. At
one time I just had a little hostile group, I just had Mike Green and
his cronies.

O.

This is a result of his experience here?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did he meet with Mike Green?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Well that's interesting. Now you've mentioned Dr. ~oran and you've
mentioned other people ·who are involved in this story. Le~s see
you've mentioned Ray Hor nback. Buford Crager, John Kleber. Who else
would you say? ·1 was involved'in the sense that you used to talk to
me about it and I remembered that about you. One of the things that
very much impressed me was the openness that you had with the faculty
as a whole. You know you were there with them and probably more successful tharr anybody that I've seen there in your position in the way you
could carryon a relaxed conversation with the faculty aud get your
points across and so forth. Many i s the talk I can remember having
with you about these things. Who were some of the others that you
talked with, that you feel were a part of the story that maybe I
could talk with? How about Ed Hicks?

A.

I talked to Ed Hicks some. I talked to Dr. Mangrum some.
Dr. Grody a lot. Dr. Grady had a lot of good judgement.

O.

He was a good friend of yours.

A.

I was talking to the administration all the time. Dean Davis, Buford
Crager, and Dr. Doran on a continuing basis,Ross McClure, Bill __ ___ _
and Playforth.

O.

You talked to Playforth?

was with them at a meeting.

Where was it held.

I was setting next to him.

I talked to
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A.

Yes, and talked to him in a number of situations. I talked to him
one on one and I talked to him in groups and sometimes at activities
or whatever. I got a lot of input from him.

O.

These are the ones that you can recall?

A.

Yes, and I even wrote
things.

O.

Do you havy any of that

A.

I don't have any of it at Morehead because after a certain age they get
rid of most of it.

Q.

Haw about some of your fellow officers, did you have much consultation
wi th them" at the tine?

A.

Yes. I had a great staff, had an enthuisastic group.
and hard work was noteworthy.

O.

Old they help you with the strategy of what you were trying to do?

A.

Yes i consulted with them, consulted with Cadets, consulted with student
with everything on campus, all the different events. ~o wnere different
people stood on things, I wasn't surprised.

O.

Old you ever talk to Dr. Reeser?

A.

Yes, not a lot, some.

Q.

Did you think that there. was any faculty that were in active opposition
to you in any way? You mentioned one guy that was an advisor to this
group?

A.

Well there were some that were conuter productive I thought.

O.

Who were they?

A.

I'd rather not say. There were one or two administrators I felt that
their judgement would create problems for us. And their judgement was
corning from protecting the President, protecting him from incidence.
There was some of that, not much.

Q.

How about Elmer Anderson?

A.

There weren't liberal elements on that campus that
that w.e re being felt in Boem places. fOr example,
of Kentucky there was one professor there that was
I don't know whether he was or not. He told group
a Cadet in my class and I find out, he's flunked.

letters to them sometimes you know, on certain
.:correspondence?

Their deaication

Not many.

created the crisis
at the university
considered a Marxist,
one time if there's
We didn't have any
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of that kind of stuff. There were some liberal elements on campus that
were , there were passivist elemnts , anarchist elements, and there were
some Marxist elements and one of the things that confounded me I would say
was how people in higher education could see any value in Marxism. I understood their concern about the evils of the private system and I used to sear
for an answer from higher education through talking with these people. One
of them, I can't think of the professors name from New York University and
others
A.

Well j~t talking about our own campus you didn't have anybody in that
category?

A.

~.

O.

Well what else can yeu 8ay about it?

A.

Well it was a good experie~ce I enjoyed it. I thought the · University
did a good job of dealing with it. I thought the faculty were
responsible,
t thought they. used good judgement and debated and I
thought they were free debate. I didn't feel like they couldn't debate."

o.

So you do think you have some written records that you might make available to me?

A.

Yes I have a few. There might be some over in the ROTC. We published
a ROTC paper and the library has the copies of them. They discontinued
that after I left.

O.

Do you remember the name of the paper?

A.

No I don't. It was sort of a one page thing written on front and back,
and it was printed in color. We sent it off first Army day. It's got
a good bit of information in there about what was going on.

Q.

Do you think the library might have held copies of that?

A.

Yes, they did, I asked them to.

Q.

Wonder where that woudl be, what's the name of it. was there any kind
of archives at the ROTC on campus?

A.

I don't know you could check with Mrs. Davis.
have any compies of it or not.

Q.

Mrs Davis, is she still here?

A.

Yes she's the continuity.

O.

Oh, she was there?

A.

Well I tell you one thing she was at Borne of those meetings and she
took down some of my letters.

I gave it to them.

I don't know if she'd

I don't know her.
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Q.

Is she the secretary?

A.

She's an administrative assistant, a fine woman.

Q.

She's not related to Dean Davis is she?

A.

No, her husband works in communications on campus,:

Q.

Well I think we've come to the end of it.

A.

Welve covered auite a little bit of territory.

